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INTRODUCTION 
HERE is an unacknowledged tension today between two unques-
tioned axioms of constitutional jurisprudence. One is the familiar 
black letter law rule that a “plaintiff generally must assert his own legal 
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights 
or interests of third parties.”1 This principle finds roots in Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, which directed federal 
courts “solely to decide on the rights of individuals.”2 The second axiom 
is implicit in numerous Supreme Court precedents dating back decades 
yet rarely articulated explicitly. It holds that private individual litigants 
can secure relief not merely for violations of their own individual rights, 
but also for infringements of the Constitution’s institutional architec-
ture—that is, states’ rights or federal branches’ prerogatives. Judges rou-
tinely invoke principles of separation of powers3 or federalism4 that 
seem to adhere primarily in institutions even as they award relief to in-
 
1 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 
2592 (2009) (“Here, as in all standing inquiries, the critical question is whether at least one 
petitioner has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant 
his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omit-
ted)); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (“[Stand-
ing] ensur[es] that the people most directly concerned are able to litigate the questions at is-
sue.” (emphasis added)). 
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (punctuation omitted). Chief 
Justice Marshall distinguished the vindication of individual rights from inquiry into “how the 
executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.” Id. 
3 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154–
56 (2010) (invalidating dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board members); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–49 
(1998) (invalidating line-item veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732−34 (1986) (inval-
idating direct congressional control of spending); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951−59 
(1983) (invalidating legislative veto).  
4 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992). 
T
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dividual litigants. Although equally hallowed, these two axioms coexist 
only uneasily, for structural constitutional principles are rarely con-
ceived in individualized terms. Rather they align more closely with a 
class of “generalized grievance[s] shared by a large number of citizens 
in a substantially equal measure”5 that Article III has been crafted to 
keep at bay. Individual standing for the structural constitution hence 
seems a species of otherwise impermissible third-party standing.6 
In a little-noticed opinion handed down in the penultimate week of 
the October Term 2010, the Supreme Court identified this tension and 
resolved it unanimously in favor of justiciability.7 Writing for a unani-
mous Court in Bond v. United States, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that 
“[a]n individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the 
constitutional balance between the National Government and the States 
when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, par-
ticular, and redressable.”8 Individuals are also protected by the separa-
tion of powers, observed Kennedy, and so are “not disabled from relying 
on [that] principle[] in otherwise justiciable cases and controversies.”9 
Bond in effect means that an individual otherwise properly situated for 
Article III purposes can involve not only her own interests but also those 
of shared constitutional institutions as grounds for relief. 
Bond occasioned thunderous silence in the law reviews.10 Perhaps the 
inattention is understandable. Bond upset no statutory or doctrinal con-
sensus. While hardly a mundane sight, individual plaintiffs do periodi-
cally invoke structural constitutional flaws as grounds for judicial reme-
diation, and have done so for more than a century.11 Nor did Bond 
 
5 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). 
6 In this Article, I use the term “individual standing” as shorthand to refer to standing for 
private, non-institutional actors, in contrast to “institutional standing.” I mean to include in 
the former term standing for corporate and associational entities that are not part of the fed-
eral or state government.  
7 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363, 2366–67 (2011). Bond was handed down 
on June 16, 2011 along with four other decisions. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2419 (2011); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Tapia v. United States, 131 
S. Ct. 2382 (2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). It arrived in the term’s 
penultimate week—the dog days insofar as landmark decisions go.  
8 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
9 Id. at 2365. 
10 An exception is a largely descriptive piece by Scott G. Thompson & Christopher 
Klimmek, Tenth Amendment Challenges After Bond v. United States, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 995, 
995–96 (2012). 
11 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918) (invalidating a federal statute 
that prohibited the interstate transportation of goods produced in factories that employed 
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occasion downstream policy upsets. Given the historical pedigree of in-
dividual standing in structural constitutional litigation, its Article III 
holding presages no large reordering of federal court litigation. On the 
contrary, the brevity and unanimity of Justice Kennedy’s opinion sug-
gested the Court was merely resolving a trivial housekeeping matter in 
the “incoherent and confusing” field of standing.12 
Such approbatory inattention, however, is unwarranted. The question 
whether individual litigants ought to have standing to raise structural 
constitutional questions is, at minimum, more complex than the Bond 
Court and commentators presume. No judicial opinion or academic as-
sessment has, in my view, yet taken the full measure of individual stand-
ing for the structural constitution. This Article aims to fill that gap. My 
ambition, to be clear at the threshold, is not to conduct that analysis by 
developing an account of the structural constitution from first principles. 
More modestly, I accept as given for present purposes both the general 
contours of Article III jurisprudence and the standard accounts of struc-
tural constitutionalism.13 By homing in on the narrow question of 
 
children); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 317–29 (1890) (habeas action striking down 
on Commerce Clause grounds a law that required all meats sold in the state to be inspected 
before being sold); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758 (1888) (considering the constitutionality of 
a statute under which defendant had been charged). It is arguably possible to go back further 
to find cases enforcing the structural constitution at the behest of individuals. See, e.g., 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 596 (1832) (invalidating a Georgia law requiring 
a license to live on a reservation as a violation of the exclusive federal power to regulate 
commerce with Indian tribes); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436–37 (1827) 
(invalidating a state statute imposing a license tax for the privilege of selling imported goods 
under the Commerce Clause and Article I, § 10). The claim advanced in this Article, for ob-
vious reasons, does not turn on historical practice—which, I want to emphasize, squarely 
cuts in the other direction. Note, however, that Coy and Barber concern habeas proceedings, 
where the scope of cognizable legal error is a function of scope of the common law writ, 
which might encompass structural constitutional questions. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 93–94 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[F]or the meaning of the term habeas corpus, 
resort may unquestionably be had to the common law . . . .”).  
12 F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 
276 (2008). 
13 In other pieces, I have raised questions about the analytic coherence of judicially created 
doctrine to enforce the structural constitution. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Col-
lective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014). Others 
have raised concerns about the lack of a common baseline or unit of analysis in thinking 
about the separation of powers. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of 
Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1194–97 (2000) (“We do not know what ‘balance’ 
means, and we do not know how it is achieved or maintained.”); accord Eric A. Posner, Bal-
ance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution 1 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 622, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178725. Even a 
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whether the Bond holding rests on firm footing in relation to its larger 
doctrinal environment, I aim to test thoroughly that discrete rule’s co-
herence or conflict with the Court’s larger body of constitutional juris-
prudence. 
My assessment of individual standing for the structural constitution is 
based on both “internalist” doctrinal and “externalist” political economy 
considerations. To begin with, I consider the Court’s tangled frame-
works for constitutional and prudential standing,14 a jurisprudential mo-
rass famous for its “unpredictability and ideological nature.”15 Precedent 
can be deployed either for or against individual standing for the structur-
al constitution. Despite this ambiguity, I suggest that one central princi-
ple of Article III jurisprudence is especially relevant: Limits on standing 
strive to sort cases for adjudication vel non based on whether there are 
large spillover effects, or externalities, affecting third-parties not before 
the court. Painting in broad brushstrokes, the Court has strived to cabin 
Article III justiciability to those categories of cases in which the practi-
cal results of litigation neither depend upon nor fall heavily upon third 
parties. Using this idea of spillovers as a touchstone for analysis, I sug-
gest that the Bond Court failed to account for Article III’s orienting am-
bition, and thus is unjustified on doctrinal grounds. 
The second strand of my analysis situates individual standing for the 
structural constitution in a political economy context. I press the perhaps 
counterintuitive point that increasing the pool of cases (by adding indi-
vidual to institutional plaintiffs) will not necessarily generate closer 
compliance with the structural constitution. More is not necessarily bet-
 
reader who views the balancing aspirations of structural constitutionalism as infeasible or 
otherwise beyond reach should nonetheless perceive that others will continue to make struc-
tural arguments both inside and outside the courts for many years to come. Such structural 
constitutionalism skeptics might see value in responding to these claims on their own doctri-
nal terms, notwithstanding their underlying analytic weaknesses, and might want to view this 
Article with a corresponding suspension of disbelief. 
14 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 619 (1989) (distinguishing prudential and 
constitutional standing). 
15 Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of 
Standing Doctrine, 121 Yale L.J. Online 121, 122 (2011); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for 
Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 304 (2002) (“Standing cases, 
taken as a whole, reveal inadequate patterns of decision-making.”). For a more nuanced and 
cautious assessment based on an empirical study of taxpayer standing cases, see Nancy C. 
Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612, 615–18 (2004) (noting the “common” 
view that “standing doctrine is so completely incoherent that judges have no choice but to 
resort to their own viewpoints when determining who has the right to be in court,” but reject-
ing this view where judges have clear guiding precedent). 
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ter, at least in this context. Supplementing institutional plaintiffs with 
individual plaintiffs yields no necessary increase in the attainment of 
structural constitutional goals, I caution, because of the different kinds 
of incentives that motivate individual and institutional litigants. Individ-
uals’ incentives, I argue, will tend to conduce away from the goals of 
structural constitutionalism, instead exacerbating rent-seeking patholo-
gies in the legislative process. In contrast, political institutions have 
more meaningful—although not perfect—cause to invoke judicial su-
pervision only when truly warranted. However distant from the ideal, in-
stitutional plaintiffs alone are still likely to generate relatively sound 
outcomes. In net, this (concededly rough) comparative analysis suggests 
that structural constitutional values are best entrusted in the courts to the 
institutions they directly benefit, and not chanced on the happenstance of 
which individual litigants find self-serving gain in their invocation. 
In lieu of the current Article III disposition, I instead propose the fol-
lowing rule: When an individual litigant seeks to enforce a structural 
constitutional principle that immediately redounds to the benefit of an 
official institution, and there is no reason the latter could not enforce 
that interest itself, a federal court should not permit the individual liti-
gant to allege and obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers 
or federalism. In the mine run of cases, Congress, the executive branch, 
or a state will be available to vindicate a structural principle. The rele-
vant institution should be left to elect whether to do so (assuming that it 
otherwise has standing16). I propose, however, that there should be no 
individual implied cause of action to vindicate the structural constitu-
tion. Instead, individual litigants should be categorically barred from ob-
taining relief based on the disparagement of governance structures held 
in common even if they have been hauled into court in the first instance 
as a civil or a criminal defendant. Consistent with my proposed rule, I 
nonetheless identify a subset of cases in which individuals ought to re-
tain standing. In these cases, litigants assert a due process-like interest 
isomorphic with Article III of the Constitution.17 Individual interest and 
structural principle wholly overlap, and no official actor stands available 
 
16 The question of how to allocate justiciability among institutional plaintiffs is not one I 
take up in this Article, which is focused solely on the propriety of individual standing for 
structural constitutional principles. 
17 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–20 (2011) (finding that a bankruptcy 
judge’s power to enter final judgment on a state law counterclaim violated Article III).  
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to enforce the structural principle. In such instances alone, standing 
should be permitted for individual litigants.18 
This Article is heterodox in two ways. To begin with, I argue against 
the conclusion drawn by the unanimous Court in Bond, a conclusion also 
implicit in many canonical earlier cases in which litigants (including 
criminal defendants) have challenged statutes as ultra vires on structural 
grounds.19 While I would not reject all structural challenges by either 
criminal or civil defendants,20 I believe many run afoul of Article III. In 
so doing, I resist conventional wisdom, confirmed in Bond, and common 
lawyerly intuitions. Skeptical readers, persuaded at the threshold by the 
conventional wisdom, might nonetheless ask themselves whether our 
current practice is obviously sensible. Does it really make sense to adju-
dicate the sprawling, multidimensional issues of federal-state relations 
implicated in Bond and its ilk through the narrowly calibrated criminal 
adjudicative process? Or to allow individual plaintiffs to vindicate Arti-
cle II values against the wishes of the president? Or to make Tenth 
Amendment arguments when there are states weighing in on the other 
side of the issue? There is nothing obvious, I would submit, about our 
current structural constitutionalism litigation arrangements. Rather, more 
careful analysis of a sort pursued in this Article is needed. 
Second, and relatedly, I diverge from an emerging body of scholar-
ship that seeks to assimilate rights and structure as substitutable strate-
gies for securing the identical end of limiting government and providing 
space for individual liberty.21 That scholarship conforms to a long, deep-
 
18 An important body of scholarship takes the more extreme position that courts should 
never pass on questions of structural constitutionalism. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial 
Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the 
Supreme Court 263 (1980); see also John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary In-
terpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1944 (2011) (arguing that “the Constitution adopts no 
freestanding principle of separation of powers” for courts to enforce (emphasis omitted)). 
My argument proceeds along different grounds, and is neither an alternative to nor incon-
sistent with the position adopted by Professors Choper and Manning. 
19 My argument about standing, however, relies on the “injury-in-fact” rule of Article III 
justiciability, which only came into force in 1970. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. 
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970). Before that date, there was no doctrinal tension of 
the kind identified here, and it would be somewhat anachronistic to criticize the pre-1970 
Court. 
20 For details of the exception, see infra Part V. 
21 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1286, 1288 (2012) (argu-
ing that “rights and votes have been viewed as functionally similar in this way in a wide ar-
ray of constitutional and political contexts”); accord Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as 
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ly felt assumption in American constitutional law that structural protec-
tions and what James Madison called the “parchment barriers” of indi-
vidual rights are devices to the same end (and, additionally, that the for-
mer are more efficacious than the latter).22 At least for the purposes of 
crafting federal court jurisdiction, I argue that a chasm indeed opens be-
tween the vindication of structural constitutional values and of individu-
al rights. Both may well be devices for promoting effective, limited gov-
ernment under law. But each operates with different mechanisms, along 
divergent channels, and with distinct effects. Placing structural values in 
the hands of individual litigants should not be equated with giving those 
same litigants the power to seek judicial vindication of their own indi-
vidual rights. 
The analysis proceeds in five steps. Part I begins by defining the do-
main of relevant inquiry, delineating the class of cases in which an indi-
vidual litigant seeks to vindicate the structural constitution. Part II can-
vasses the relevant standing doctrine and sketches the Bond Court’s log-
logic. Parts III and IV comprise the analytic heart of the paper. Part III 
situates Bond in its wider doctrinal context. I argue that the relatively 
parsimonious analysis of the Bond opinion, while not wholly without 
doctrinal warrant, lies in some tension with Article III’s larger aims. 
More aggressively, I press the suggestion that a contrary holding in 
Bond would cohere better with the spillover-limiting ambition of Article 
III jurisprudence. Part IV turns from doctrine to political economy. 
Drawing on institutional design and public choice analytic tools, I iden-
tify a spectrum of undesirable effects from supplementing institutional 
with individual standing for the structural constitution. Part V then pro-
poses an alternative rule that would preclude most (but not all) individu-
al standing for the structural constitution. 
I. INDIVIDUAL LITIGANTS AND THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION 
Structural constitutional questions come to federal courts in several 
ways. To clarify the scope of my argument, I begin by identifying the 
subset of cases with which I am concerned here. I then explain why 
 
a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1132−33 (1991); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1677 (2012). 
22 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in Jack N. Rakove, 
Declaring Rights: A Brief History with Documents 160, 161 (1998). Madison used the same 
phrase elsewhere to refer to structural constitutionalism. See The Federalist No. 48, at 274 
(James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, Foresman & Co. 1898). 
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these cases in fact implicate the defense of structural interests alone, and 
cannot be fairly characterized as involving the defense of some sort of 
individual right—specifically, what has been called a right to a valid 
rule. 
A. Structural Constitutional Litigation in Federal Court 
To begin with, what is the class of litigation in which individuals, ra-
ther than official, institutional actors, bring structural constitutional 
claims? It is certainly not the entire domain of structural constitutional 
litigation. Institutional actors often press their own constitutional inter-
ests in federal court. The president, for example, routinely asserts an Ar-
ticle II interest in exercising control over administrative agencies.23 
Congress, acting through its committees, can also file suit seeking to 
vindicate constitutionally grounded interests in the midst of inter-branch 
conflicts.24 States too vindicate federalism interests by resisting national 
commandeering,25 asserting sovereign immunity,26 and challenging con-
ditions freighted with federal spending.27 Indeed, the only constitutional-
ly salient institution that lacks the capacity to lodge objections in court 
 
23 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116, 176 (1926) (invalidating statutory 
constraints on the President’s removal power respecting a first-class postmaster); see also 
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (finding limits to the President’s power to 
remove members of the War Claims Commission implicit in the preclusion of the President 
from influencing the Commission’s decisions with respect to particular claims); Humphrey’s 
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1935) (endorsing statutory limits on the Presi-
dent’s authority to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission).  
24 See, e.g., Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 
53, 92−93 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
715, 735–42 (2012) (describing congressional contempt authority). Individual legislators 
also have standing to seek relief based on impermissible exclusion from a chamber, see 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969), or alleged unconstitutional dilution of vot-
ing power, see Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 625–26, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that 
plaintiff legislators had standing, but rejecting claim on the merits).  
25 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
26 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 72–73 (1996) (disallowing ouster of 
state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 
(1999) (extending state sovereign immunity to state court proceedings). 
27 See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011) (concluding that absent an 
“unequivocal expression of state consent” the phrase “appropriate relief” in the 2000 Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act could not be construed to permit money 
damages). 
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on structural constitutional grounds is the Article III judiciary itself.28 
With that one exception—to which I return later29—the doors to the fed-
eral courthouse stand, as a practical matter, open to any of the institu-
tional entities picked out in the Constitution as salient features of our 
structural constitution. 
But the courthouse doors also stand open to individual litigants seek-
ing to vindicate structural constitutional values. In the separation of 
powers context, for example, an individual litigant can lodge a facial 
challenge to federal legislation on the ground that it violates some aspect 
of the constitutional structure. Consider the 2010 decision in Free En-
terprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.30 In Free 
Enterprise Fund, a Nevada accounting firm challenged the regulatory 
authority of the federal Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”).31 The accounting firm did not assert PCAOB had infringed 
on any constitutionally protected individual right or interest that the firm 
possessed, but rather that the Board’s organic act “contravened the sepa-
ration of powers by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board 
members without subjecting them to Presidential control.”32 Even 
though the President evinced no wish for greater control of the board,33 
the Court invalidated one part of PCAOB’s organic statute so as to es-
tablish more direct presidential control.34 
Free Enterprise Fund is not an outlier. In many earlier separation of 
powers cases, individual litigants have been allowed to raise the interests 
of either Congress or the executive as a shield against regulation or co-
ercive action.35 Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
 
28 The interests protected by Article III might be vindicated in the context of litigation filed 
by an individual judge. The Court to date has resisted invitations to develop that sort of case 
law. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–35 (1993) (holding that the judiciary 
may not review the procedures used by Congress to impeach judges due to the political ques-
tion doctrine).  
29 See infra Part V. 
30 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).  
31 Id. at 3149. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 3154 (stating that the Solicitor General, representing the President’s interests, 
“was unwilling to concede that even five layers between the President and the Board would 
be too many” (emphasis omitted)).  
34 Id. at 3161–62 (declining to invalidate the statute in its entirety, instead severing the un-
constitutional dual for-cause removal provisions from the remainder of the statute). 
35 Hence, in INS v. Chadha, the Court invalidated the line-item veto at the behest of a 
noncitizen litigant in an immigration proceeding. 462 U.S. 919, 930−31, 959 (1983). In Clin-
ton v. City of New York, the Court allowed recipients of federal spending to challenge Presi-
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Columbia in Noel Canning v. NLRB allowed a business regulated under 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)36 to challenge an enforce-
ment action on the basis of an alleged failure to comply with the Recess 
Appointments Clause of Article II in respect to new members of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.37 The Noel Canning plaintiffs had waived 
the Article II objection by failing to raise it before the agency, a waiver 
that triggered a statutory bar to judicial review. Yet the circuit court ex-
ercised its statutory discretion to overcome that waiver, suggesting that 
the Article II issue “go[es] to the very power of the Board to act and im-
plicate[s] fundamental separation of powers concerns.”38 It then framed 
and resolved the plaintiffs’ challenge not as a gloss on what the NLRA 
required, but as a direct and unmediated inquiry into constitutional law.39 
Noel Canning, therefore, comfortably fits within the class of cases this 
Article addresses: It involved an extraordinary exercise of discretionary 
jurisdiction to reach and resolve a constitutional question conceptually 
decoupled from the statutory grant of authority at stake. 
Noel Canning shows how structural constitutional principles can sup-
plement generally available grounds for agency supervision, such as the 
workaday allegation that an agency has exceeded its statutory ambit.40 
But it also bears noting that the Article III standing question at stake in 
Noel Canning would not have been materially different had the statutory 
grant of jurisdiction conditioned agency sanctions on compliance with a 
 
dent Clinton’s use of a line-item veto as an infringement on Congress’s lawmaking authority. 
524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998). 
36 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
37 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (identifying U.S. Const. art 
II, § 2, cl. 3 as basis of challenge), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
38 Id. at 497 (relying on language contained in 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2012)). Readers famil-
iar with the federal courts approach to federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2012) should be especially struck by this claim: In that domain, the constitutional character 
of a flaw in the underlying process provides no additional justification at all for judicial re-
view. To the contrary, rules such as procedural default and abuse of the writ routinely pre-
clude the federal court adjudication of alleged constitutional flaws in anterior process. The 
Noel Canning court gave no justification for why review of agency action should be so dif-
ferently organized. 
39 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 499–512. 
40 This sort of ordinary assertion of statutory error does not become a structural constitu-
tional claim merely because it can be redescribed as an allegation of executive ultra vires 
action. Whether a rule regulating primary conduct touches on a specific litigant, that is, does 
not implicate the spillover or political economy concerns aired in Parts III and IV. 
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structural constitutional rule.41 At present, the generic judicial review 
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) anticipates con-
stitutional challenges to agency action and is construed broadly when 
violations of individual constitutional rights are alleged.42 The statute, 
however, does not unequivocally invite the full gamut of structural chal-
lenges, as distinct from more mundane challenges to the effect that an 
agency has exceeded its statutory authority through erroneous construc-
tion of its organic statute.43 Rather than being wholly open-ended, APA 
review obtains only when a “legal wrong” is inflicting and is otherwise 
subject to important limits.44 So it is at least unclear whether the APA 
installs federal courts as free-ranging censors of constitutional errors of 
administrative agency.  
Had Congress expressly authorized judicial review based on any 
structural constitutional error, a Court would have to address the ques-
tion raised in this Article—whether such individual standing for the 
structural constitution should be permitted. The inquiry would be corru-
gated by the persisting uncertainty as to whether the Court believes that 
Congress has discretion to loosen otherwise applicable Article III con-
straints.45 Further undermining the potential for prediction, Congress’s 
choice of procedural vehicle may also influence the scope of review for 
 
41 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).  
42 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that “where Congress intends to 
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear . . . to avoid 
the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to 
deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim” (citations omitted)).  
43 A claim that an agency has exceeded its statutory authority can be characterized in two 
ways. First, it is a request for mundane error correction on a matter of statutory law. Second, 
it is a challenge to ultra vires agency action in violation of the separation of powers. Because 
the APA clearly encompasses the former, there is no reason to construe it as widely as an 
open-ended permission to hear structural constitutional claims.  
44 See, e.g., Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 504 (2007) (noting exception for deci-
sions “committed to agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). 
45 Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (“Whether the 
courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete in-
jury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to 
the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch . . . .”), with id. at 580 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not 
read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view.”). See also Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (describing the tripartite Lujan test as a “hard floor”).  
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legal error.46 For the purposes of this analysis, however, I largely bracket 
the question whether congressional authorization of individual standing 
for the structural constitution that Article III bars would be permissible 
in favor of resolving the first-order constitutional problem. 
Individual enforcement of structural values is also observed in feder-
alism cases. The Court allows individual litigants to challenge federal 
statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause on the ground that the re-
served authority of the several states has been violated.47 It also permits 
individual litigants to challenge state measures for trenching upon feder-
al prerogatives.48 In National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (“NFIB”), both individual and state plaintiffs challenged the 
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as beyond Congress’s 
Article I powers.49 Other cases, however, have involved only individual 
plaintiffs. In the path-marking 1995 case of United States v. Lopez, for 
instance, the litigant challenging the Gun-Free School Zones Act50 as 
beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority was a former student ar-
 
46 For example, the scope of constitutionally mandated judicial review differs according to 
whether the APA or habeas is the vehicle for challenging agency action. In the former case, 
there is no constitutional problem with outcome-determinative deference to executive branch 
determinations of questions of law in the judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 969–70 (1992) (de-
scribing sweeping consequences of varying the degree of judicial deference). In the latter 
case, judicial review must extend to all questions of law by dint of the Suspension Clause. 
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–05 (2001) (suggesting that the Suspension Clause 
mandates that the writ permit judicial decisions on any “pure questions of law” implicated by 
a detention). The interaction of the Suspension Clause with the scope of legal review raises 
complex questions that are beyond the scope of this Article. My tentative view, however, is 
that habeas jurisdiction outside the postconviction arena entails challenges to the absence of 
legal authority, but would not permit the full gamut of challenges on Article I or Article II 
grounds. 
47 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–17 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). For an overview of 
how these cases fit within a larger trajectory of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Aziz Z. 
Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575, 589–96 
(2013).  
48 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 784–85, 838 (1995). The 
individual plaintiff in Thornton, a member of the League of Woman Voters, challenged a 
state constitutional amendment on the ground that it violated Article I of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Id. at 784–85. 
49 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (listing plaintiffs). At least with respect to the Commerce 
Clause analysis, the various opinions in NFIB evince little attention to the difference be-
tween individual and official institutional plaintiffs.  
50 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1988) (amended 2012). 
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rested at his high school in possession of a firearm.51 So self-evident was 
it that Mr. Lopez could bring a Commerce Clause challenge that neither 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion nor any of the Lopez concur-
rences or dissents stopped to explain why he should have that entitle-
ment. Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, the Court did not pause to 
ponder whether Mr. Morrison and his codefendants in a civil action filed 
under the Violence Against Women Act had a right to challenge that 
statute as a valid Commerce Clause measure.52 
In summary, a powerful case on behalf of individual standing for the 
structural constitution can be made simply on the basis of practice.53 The 
question persists, though, whether to interrogate that practice as mis-
guided on other constitutional grounds. 
B. Why Structural Constitutional Rules Are Not Individual Rights 
If it is banal to see individual litigants invoking Article III jurispru-
dence and obtaining rulings on structural constitutional grounds, should 
not the further inference be drawn that in doing so, they are vindicating 
their own constitutional entitlements? Indeed, perhaps such litigation is 
evidence that the structural elements of the Constitution vest individuals 
with legally cognizable rights to raise before the federal bench. This 
Section considers and rejects that possibility. In Section I.C, I then raise 
and reject an alternative justification of individual standing for the struc-
tural constitution in which individuals are said to have a cognizable right 
against legal rules that are invalid on structural constitutional grounds, 
even on the assumption that the separation of powers and federalism do 
not engender discrete, individualized legal entitlements. 
A differentiation between constitutional structure and rights is not 
immediately obvious on the face of the Constitution. Provisions now 
taken as self-evidently generative of rights speak in terms of the gov-
ernment’s powers.54 In contrast, some structural provisions are redolent 
 
51 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
52 529 U.S. at 603–04 (discussing initial civil action). 
53 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 414–17 (2012) (offering an account and a partial critique of 
the use of historical gloss). 
54 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
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of rights-talk.55 Moreover, neither federalism nor the separation of pow-
ers is instantiated in simple form in the text.56 Superficial textual exege-
sis, in short, provides no ready rule of classification.57 Absent further 
hermeneutical labor, it is simply unclear whether there are individual 
rights to the structural constitution. 
Although the text is silent, there is reason to think that the Framers 
did indeed distinguish individual rights from structure. Accounts of the 
Constitution from its inception take pains to stress the difference be-
tween rights and structure. Writing as Publius, Alexander Hamilton thus 
urged that the original Constitution—which, of course, contained the 
separation of powers and federalism principles—not be understood in 
terms of vested rights. To the contrary, Hamilton inveighed, “Bills of 
Rights . . . are not only unnecessary . . . but would even be dangerous. 
They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on 
this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than 
were granted.”58 Echoing this claim, James Wilson later argued in favor 
of ratification on the ground that “[i]t would be very extraordinary to 
have a bill of rights, because the powers of Congress are expressly de-
fined. . . . We retain all those rights which we have not given away to the 
general government.”59 Hamilton’s and Wilson’s skepticism is also con-
sistent with Madison’s earlier warning that it would not be “sufficient to 
 
55 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Inva-
sion . . . .”). 
56 This has led some commentators to query whether such structural principles should be 
given legal force. See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2037–47 (2009); Manning, supra note 18, at 
1944.  
57 It is also a truism that rights impose constraints on government action, and that their jus-
ticiability empowers courts to block elected branches’ choices. But this is to say that rights-
related litigation has an effect on the separation of powers, which is quite different from con-
cluding that there is an individual right to certain structural arrangements. 
58 The Federalist No. 84, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, 
Foresman & Co. 1898). Hamilton also lists the rights contained in the original Constitu-
tion—and pointedly does not list either federalism or the separation of powers. Id. at 467–68. 
There is rich irony in the fact that Hamilton would be the progenitor of perhaps the most ag-
gressive readings of Article I in the early Republic—readings that made his Federalist 84 
claims wholly implausible. That irony, however, does not impinge the point that the original 
public meaning of the 1787 Constitution, as reflected by Publius, did not attach rights to 
structural provisions. 
59 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 540 (1969) 
(second alteration in original). 
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mark, with precision, the boundaries of [government power],”60 and that 
institutional design would have to be exploited to keep government in 
check rather than mere individual entitlements. In short, to the extent 
original public understandings of the Constitution’s aims are salient, 
they tend against conceptualizing structural constitutional principles in 
granular individualistic terms. 
Additional evidence corroborating that conclusion derives from the 
idiom of modern case law. Even though it is willing to allow individuals 
to litigate the structural constitution, the Court does not generally focus 
on the liberties of specific regulated individuals when adjudicating struc-
tural constitutional litigation. It instead directs attention to the interests 
of the branches or the several states. In Lopez, for example, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist began his inquiry into the “outer limits” of congressional 
power by invoking “our dual system of government.”61 Explaining why 
the challenged statute had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of 
economic enterprise,” the Chief Justice invoked the states’ primacy in 
administering criminal justice.62 Sounding the same chords in Morrison, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that “the Framers crafted the federal 
system of Government so that the people’s rights would be secured by 
the division of power”63—that is, not directly, but through empowerment 
of the states. Rather than stressing any individual privilege on the chal-
lengers’ part, Rehnquist contrasted federal disability with “the police 
power, which the Founders . . . reposed in the States”—a power that in-
cluded the power to sanction the challengers’ conduct.64 Simply put, the 
idiom of the case law is at odds with the notion that there is an individu-
al right to federalism or the separation of powers. 
In yet another way, the observed fact of structural constitutional liti-
gation cannot be easily reduced to the conclusion that structural princi-
ples in the Constitution create individual rights: In none of the structural 
constitutionalism cases mentioned above65 does a challenger assert an 
absolute privilege to act in a specific way. That is, there is no claim that 
an individual (or firm) has a zone of privileged action from any federal 
or state regulation. To the contrary, in many of the aforementioned cas-
 
60 The Federalist No. 48, supra note 22, at 274. 
61 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). 
62 Id. at 561 & n.3. 
63 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 618 & n.8. 
65 See supra Section I.A. 
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es, the exact same act by the exact same individual can plainly be regu-
lated by some governmental entity. After Lopez, for example, Congress 
enacted a new statute with substantially the same reach as the one inval-
idated by the Supreme Court, albeit with a supplemental jurisdictional 
element to remedy the constitutional defect.66 Another Mr. Lopez would 
likely have found no immunity from that statute. Similarly, the Free En-
terprise Fund plaintiffs asserted no absolute right to be free of properly 
constituted federal regulation of accounting firms operating in interstate 
commerce, and only claimed the ‘right’ to a slightly different regulatory 
architecture. In neither case is the individual conduct at issue categori-
cally protected, and so in neither case does it make obvious sense to talk 
of an individual negative right being infringed by the federal govern-
ment. 
Alternatively, consider the relationship between individual rights and 
structural principles through the lens of the cause of action doctrine. The 
question whether a litigant possesses a cause of action pertains to 
“whether, in light of all legal determinants that relate to a particular 
transaction or occurrence, the plaintiff is entitled to some form of judi-
cial relief,” and as such is acoustically separate from allocations of pri-
mary rights or eventual remedies.67 Rather, the cause of action is a con-
cept that in effect mediates between the definition of rights and the 
distribution of remedies. At present, not all constitutional violations en-
gender implied rights of action for damages. The Court instead vests in-
dividual litigants with an implied right of action to seek damages based 
on constitutional violations by federal actors in respect to some, but not 
other, individual constitutional rights.68 Hence, another way of framing 
the question I am pressing here is to ask whether there is an individual 
implied right of action for either damages or injunctive relief in respect 
to alleged violations of the structural constitution. Given the currently 
patchwork distribution of implied rights of action against the federal 
 
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly 
to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign com-
merce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school 
zone.”).  
67 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 781 
(2004) (emphasis omitted).  
68 Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 397 (1971) (endorsing implied cause of action under the Fourth Amendment), with 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (finding no implied cause of action for retaliation 
claim under the First Amendment).  
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government, it is by no means clear that current doctrine either requires 
or forbids recognition of implied individual causes of action for structur-
al violations. 
In short, there is little reason to think that the Constitution’s structural 
provisions, properly glossed, engender individual entitlements in the 
same way as the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause. Instead, individual standing for structural prin-
ciples is unanchored in any readily available account of discrete, person-
alized rights in constitutional structure and thus requires a distinct justi-
fication. 
C. The Valid Rule Doctrine 
Even setting aside the idea that there is an individual right to federal-
ism or the separation of powers, the gravamen of challengers’ arguments 
in Free Enterprise Fund, Lopez, and Morrison might nonetheless be 
characterized in a way that redounds in cognizable individual-rights 
terms. On this view, individual litigants raising separation of powers or 
federalism claims are pressing a “right to insist on the application of a 
constitutionally valid rule.”69 As first framed by Professor Henry Mona-
ghan, this “valid rule” doctrine directs that federal court litigants are 
“always” allowed to “insist that [their] conduct be judged in accordance 
with a rule that is constitutionally valid.”70 Hence, a litigant always has 
standing to raise questions about the “constitutional sufficiency of the 
rule actually invoked against him” in the course of a coercive govern-
ment action.71 This individualized interest sounds in due process,72 yet is 
not reducible to a more familiar right against laws that “exercis[e] judi-
cial power or abrogat[e] common law procedural protections.”73 
 
69 Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4.  
70 Id. at 8; accord Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 283 
(1984) [hereinafter Monaghan, Third Party Standing] (“Any litigant has the right to make a 
facial challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of the rule actually invoked against him [or 
her], without regard to whether his [or her] own conduct could validly have been regulated 
by a differently formulated rule.” (footnote omitted)); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-
Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1331–32 
(2000) (endorsing the “valid rule” formulation).  
71 Monaghan, Third Party Standing, supra note 70, at 283. 
72 Id. at 282 (describing jus tertii challenges as resting on “a substantive due process right 
to interact with a third party right holder free from unjustifiable governmental interference”). 
73 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 21, at 1677. The valid rule doctrine is orthogonal to 
another important account of due process that has recently been offered by Professors 
Chapman and McConnell. They, too, explicitly tether their originalist account of due process 
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In my view, the valid rule doctrine does not provide a satisfying ac-
count of these cases for three independent reasons. First, the valid rule 
doctrine is inconsistently applied in ways that undermine the claim that 
it has explanatory power in a litigation context. More specifically, the 
text of the Constitution generates a cornucopia of structural rules re-
specting the mechanics of government. Taken seriously, the valid rule 
doctrine would entail that litigants could challenge any coercive measure 
based on any defect in the enacting process. 
But that is simply not a plausible account of current constitutional 
practice. Individual litigants cannot now complain about any flaw in the 
official process leading to the enactment of a challenged law. For in-
stance, a litigant complaining that a law is invalid because it was enacted 
in violation of the mandatory Article I, Section 7, process of bicameral-
ism will find no judicial audience.74 Formally, litigants do have standing 
to claim the Origination Clause was violated.75 But there is no case in 
which such a claim secures relief, and indeed it is hard to envisage the 
Court acquiescing in the judicial invalidation of a federal statute on such 
grounds any time soon.76 Or imagine a case in which a member of Con-
gress is unlawfully appointed to an executive branch office, in violation 
of the Emoluments Clause,77 and then takes a coercive action against an 
 
to structural constitutional principles. But they root due process in (1) the forms of common 
law judicial protection, and (2) the protection of vested property rights. Id. at 1726–27. Their 
due process principle does not explain (and does not purport to explain) cases such as 
Chadha, Bowsher, or Free Enterprise Fund, where no vested property interest is at stake. 
Nor does it seek to account for cases in which the allegedly imperiled structural principle is 
unrelated to the judiciary. Consequently, it would be an error to identify the valid rule doc-
trine with the distinct account offered by Professors Chapman and McConnell. Further, the 
arguments I tender against the valid rule doctrine are not intended to bear on their distinct 
and different claim. 
74 This is a consequence of the enrolled bill doctrine. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court 
for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that “the Courts of Appeals have 
consistently” barred challenge to federal laws based on the claim that different versions of 
the law passed the two Houses); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec’y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 203 
(2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the Supreme Court has a longstanding tradition of denying stand-
ing to plaintiffs who challenge a federal law by arguing that the text of the final law differs 
from the text of the enrolled bill).  
75 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).  
76 Cf. Tex. Ass’n of Concerned Taxpayers v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 166–67 (5th Cir. 
1985) (holding that the meaning of “raising revenue” within the Origination Clause was a 
nonjusticiable political question left to Congress to define).  
77 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time 
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United 
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individual that the displaced officer had eschewed. No court will inter-
vene on the basis of that constitutional process flaw.78 Indeed, so firmly 
entrenched is the Emoluments Clause’s judicial desuetude that some 
commentators have suggested that a “constitutionally conscientious” of-
ficial might legitimately disregard its command.79 
Yet even as these structural rules can be flouted, the Court is willing 
to grant standing to individuals threatened with a coercive proceeding on 
the ground that an investigating officer is subject to insufficient hierar-
chical control under Article II.80 What explains the difference in judicial 
treatment? It cannot be grounded in a distinction in the degree of textual 
entrenchment. The Court has strikingly chosen to leave unenforced 
structural constitutional rules with a plainly expressed textual berth 
(such as the Emoluments Clause), but has granted individuals relief 
based on violations of an atextual rule in favor of presidential removal 
authority. Nor can a “valid rule” principle elucidate why some constitu-
tional provisions generate cognizable rights against “invalid” rules, 
while others do not. On the contrary, the valid rule doctrine does no 
helpful analytic work explaining the divergent treatment of various con-
stitutional process flaws.81 It merely provides a convenient label for the 
post hoc classification of outcomes. 
Second, the valid rule doctrine is descriptively inaccurate insofar as it 
fails to explain why the Court is willing to deny relief in cases when an 
otherwise enforceable constitutional right has been violated. That is, just 
as the valid rule doctrine cannot explain the piebald treatment of struc-
tural principles, so too it cannot justify the chiaroscuro enforcement of 
individual rights. Writing a decade after having first limned the valid 
rule doctrine, Professor Monaghan recognized as much when he resisted 
 
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased 
[sic] during such time.”).  
78 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209, 217 (1974) 
(denying standing in a challenge to the eligibility of members of Congress to hold commis-
sions in the Armed Forces Reserves during their continuance in office).  
79 Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 51 (1999). 
80 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 
(2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 669–70 (1988). 
81 Further, to the extent that the government can act before a court might intervene and 
then resist any ex post damages award, it is not clear that the valid rule has any meaningful 
role to play. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying damages to plaintiffs allegedly harmed by U.S. military action 
based on political question grounds).  
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the then-emergent doctrine of harmless error in constitutional cases.82 
Since then, the Supreme Court has expanded harmless error analysis in 
the postconviction context while raising the burden necessary to warrant 
reversal.83 Harmless error doctrine, moreover, is only one of a slate of 
doctrines—including absolute and qualified immunity, nonretroactivity, 
and limits on vicarious liability—that ensures a “right-remedy gap in 
constitutional law.”84 Although there might be sound justifications for 
that divide,85 its existence speaks loudly against the valid rule doctrine—
a rule that cannot fairly account for the observed lacunae in the remedia-
tion of uncontested constitutional rights violations today. 
Third, the valid rule doctrine coexists with another principle of feder-
al adjudication, which might be labeled the light footprint principle. This 
stipulates that courts must minimize the displacement of democratic 
preferences in legislated form.86 Showing fidelity to this light footprint 
principle, the Court prefers narrow, as-applied challenges as opposed to 
the “strong medicine” of facial invalidation.87 It occasionally suggests 
“[a] challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid” to prevail in a facial challenge.88 And 
“when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute,” the Court tries “to 
limit the solution to the problem,” and prefers “to enjoin only the uncon-
stitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in 
 
82 Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 195, 211 (“I do not think that the Supreme Court can invoke harmless error principles 
to sustain the imposition of sanctions when the . . . state court has itself proceeded on the 
basis of an invalid rule.”). 
83 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) (requiring that the state show that 
a constitutional error did not substantially influence the jury). 
84 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 91 
(2000). 
85 Id. at 90 (arguing that the gap “fosters the development of constitutional law” by lower-
ing the price of doctrinal change). 
86 This is in effect a rule of institutional settlement that makes the more democratic 
branches, rather than the courts, the residual claimant on the exercise of discretionary policy 
choice. 
87 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (quoting Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)); accord United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–22 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. 
Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912). 
88 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. 
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force . . . or to sever its problematic portions while leaving the remainder 
intact.”89 
In combination with each other, the valid rule and light footprint prin-
ciples suggest that the Court should invalidate only the set of applica-
tions of a challenged statute that are not valid rules, while preserving 
applications that are constitutionally valid. The Court should further in-
validate a statutory provision in toto only if that provision cannot be 
subdivided into valid (sub)rules and invalid (sub)rules.90 Hence, rather 
than striking down a whole federal law on Commerce Clause grounds, 
the Court ought to narrow it to the subset of instances in which it can be 
validly applied to individuals within Congress’s Article I reach. 
But this is not what the Court does. That is, the Court does not distin-
guish cases in which a federal law can be applied validly to an individu-
al from cases in which an individual is beyond Congress’s power. In-
stead, both Lopez and Morrison yielded facial invalidations of the 
statutes being challenged.91 In neither case did the Court even entertain 
the possibility of disaggregating the challenged provision into valid rules 
and invalid rules. Similarly, in the recent challenge to the federal 
healthcare law, Chief Justice Roberts’s pivotal opinion treated the chal-
lenged individual mandate provision as a unit whole, not a collection of 
potentially disparate applications.92 His failure to disaggregate valid and 
invalid applications of the individual mandate is even more striking than 
the lacunae in Lopez and Morrison because there were (unrefuted) ar-
 
89 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (cita-
tions omitted). 
90 This is the view taken by commentators of very different methodological stripes. See 
Fallon, supra note 70, at 1331 (identifying “an implicit assumption that any constitutionally 
invalid statutory subrules . . . could be severed or separated from valid ones”); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 877 (2005) (“What 
really distinguishes a facial challenge is not its breadth, but that it involves an attack on the 
general rule embodied in a statute.”). Rejecting traditional models of severity, Professor 
Kevin Walsh also finds historical support for the idea that courts should “not . . . infer inva-
lidity beyond unconstitutionality.” Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 738, 743 (2010). Professors Fallon, Metzger, and Walsh diverge in how they frame the 
analysis, but are united in their respect for what I have called the light footprint principle. 
91 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 (stating that “the Commerce Clause does not provide Con-
gress with authority to enact § 13981”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (analyzing statutory provi-
sion as a unitary whole, not as severable application); see also Metzger, supra note 90, at 907 
(noting that Lopez and Morrison “quite clearly continue the Court’s willingness to entertain 
facial challenges to the constitutionality of commerce power legislation”). 
92 See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (analyzing the “individual mandate’s regulation of 
the uninsured as a class”). 
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guments aired by courts of appeal judges to the effect that many (if not 
all) applications of the mandate were plainly constitutional even under 
an ungenerous reading of the Commerce Clause.93 In effect, the Court in 
Commerce Clause litigation evinces no concern with the validity of the 
federal statutory rule as applied to a specific litigant. Instead of applying 
the valid rule test to the specific circumstances of individual litigants, 
the Court focuses on the offense to states’ interests writ large that flows 
from a federal statute. The Justices, hence, strike down statutes in toto 
when the latter impinge upon states’ rights. “[T]he nature of the claim 
being asserted”94 and vindicated in these cases is the alleged offense to 
federalism values—not an individual privilege to sally forth armed at 
high school, rape women, or freeride on a federal medical safety net. 
This constitutional offense cannot be assuaged by shaving individual 
applications from the law’s reach in accord with the valid rule doctrine. 
It is sated only by facial invalidation.95 
In summary, there is a class of structural constitutional litigation in 
which the Court’s concern is not well understood as vindication of an 
individual constitutional right or privilege, such as the valid rule doc-
trine. Rather, the Court’s analysis and remedies make sense only on the 
assumption that the Justices are vindicating a structural principle of fed-
eralism or the separation of powers—one that benefits in the first in-
stance institutions—but doing so at the behest of individual litigants. It 
is in respect to this class of cases, which includes both federalism and 
separation of powers matters, that there is cause to press further on the 
justifications for permitting individual litigants to obtain relief when the 
interests of states and branches are disregarded. 
II. THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION AGAINST STANDING DOCTRINE 
To identify a set of cases in which individual litigants obtain access to 
federal court to vindicate the constitutional interests of third-party insti-
 
93 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565–66 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., 
concurring in part), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.  
94 Metzger, supra note 90, at 881 (treating this as key to whether a challenge is facial or as-
applied). 
95 Moreover, it is almost never clear whether or when a law must be treated as a unitary 
whole as opposed to a series of separable subrules. Cf. Fallon, supra note 70, at 1331 (using 
terminology of “subrules”). The prevailing approach to severability turns on legislative in-
tent, see Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987), and so laws typically lack natu-
ral “joints” that can be employed to separate out subrules or separate families of applica-
tions. 
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tutions—occasionally even over the protests of those very institutions—
is to set the stage for this Article’s central puzzle: Canonical accounts of 
standing suggest that the federal courthouse door is open only to indi-
viduals seeking redress for violations of their own rights. How then is it 
that some individual litigants have standing under the structural constitu-
tion for the rights of institutions such as states and branches? To answer 
that question, it is helpful to begin with a brief overview of standing 
doctrine before turning to the Court’s solution in Bond. 
A. The Logic of Standing 
Article III’s “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies” language is glossed to re-
quire that litigants “demonstrate a ‘personal stake’ in the suit.”96 To test 
the sufficiency of that “personal” stake, the Court has developed a three-
part doctrine of constitutional standing. There is also a similarly plural 
constellation of prudential rules, although they are applied more inter-
mittently. Both the constitutional and the prudential standing frame-
works have shifted recently from an approach focused on legal wrongs 
to one focused on injury in fact. Yet the resulting doctrinal frameworks 
have only partially displaced earlier approaches.97 The resulting law is 
complex and contested. My purpose here is to describe it, and not to ad-
vocate its wholesale reform, however urgently the latter might be want-
ed. 
To secure constitutional standing, litigants must show (1) they have 
“suffered an injury in fact”—one that is concrete, particularized, and ei-
ther actual or imminent—that is (2) caused by “the conduct complained 
of,” and that (3) “will be redressed by a favorable decision.”98 In addi-
tion to this tripartite constitutional core, the Court has also “self-
imposed”99 a series of “prudential” constraints on standing.100 Hence, the 
Court has said (1) that claimants must be “arguably within the zone of 
 
96 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009)). 
97 For a useful history of the doctrine, see Fletcher, supra note 1, at 224–28. 
98 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
99 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
100 Prudential standing rules can be overriden by Congress. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 
(1998). 
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interests to be protected or regulated by [a] statute”;101 (2) that they must 
assert their own rights, and not “the legal rights of others”;102 and (3) 
that they cannot be seeking redress for mere “generalized griev-
ance[s].”103 Like the entangled warp and woof of a Persian carpet, these 
diverse constitutional and prudential elements imbricate and blur into 
one another. In particular, the particularized harm element of constitu-
tional standing echoes the prudential rules against generalized grievanc-
es and third-party standing. For example, in rejecting taxpayers’ objec-
tions to federal expenditures on constitutional grounds, the Court has 
framed their interests as too generalized (a prudential problem) since 
they are “shared with millions of others [and are] minute and indetermi-
nable,” rather than being concrete and particularized (a constitutional 
problem).104 For better or worse, the complex network of standing doc-
trine has an internal logic and integrity of its own. 
 
101 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 
2210 (2012) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 
(1970)); see also Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 
488 (1998) (explaining that the zone-of-interests test is nothing more than a requirement of 
“prudential standing” under the APA). 
102 Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 290 (2008); accord Sec’y of State 
of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984) (stating that a plaintiff ordinarily 
“‘cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties’” (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert 
the rights of third persons.”). 
103 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“[A] taxpayer may not ‘employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal Sys-
tem.’” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
104 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006) (quoting Frothingham v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)); see also Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 
(1969) (stating that a general interest in the constitutionality of law is not an actual contro-
versy). Elsewhere, however, the Court has suggested that a “harm [can be] concrete,” though 
“widely shared” provided that it is not “abstract and indefinite.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 23–24. 
The Akins majority opinion sparked a sharp dissent from Justice Scalia, who emphasized that 
the generalized grievance bar arises not only when harms are widely shared, but also “undif-
ferentiated,” in that “the harm caused to” the litigant “is precisely the same as the harm 
caused to everyone else.” Id. at 35–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s logic on this 
point does not account for the fact that informational deprivations of the kind at issue in 
Akins can have particularized and differentiated effects on different members of the public. 
For example, opponents of the alleged political committee whose data was at issue in Akins 
had a distinctive and sharply defined interest that other members of the polity did not in ob-
taining the release of the information sought. 
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The central, and centrally contested, concept in contemporary stand-
ing doctrine is the injury-in-fact requirement.105 While there is some 
question about the overall doctrine’s historical pedigree,106 it is tolerably 
clear that the injury-in-fact requirement as currently formulated is a ju-
dicial novation by Justice Douglas. Until 1970, the courts asked instead 
whether litigants had a “legal right,” not an injury in fact.107 Judges also 
tended to embrace a capacious construction of statutory judicial review 
provisions, permitting suit by those “aggrieved or whose interests are 
adversely affected.”108 It was not until the 1970s, and an opinion by Jus-
tice Douglas in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp (Data Processing) that the Court coined the phrase “injury in 
fact.”109 Four decades of jurisprudence have not cast favorable light on 
the injury-in-fact rule.110 The latter pushes courts into open-ended, free-
form, and near metaphysical inquiries into the adequacy of alleged inju-
ries. Persistent disagreement between the Justices shows that the concept 
 
105 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 183–93 (1992) (critiquing persuasively the concept of inju-
ry in fact). 
106 In a series of influential articles, Professors Cass Sunstein and Steven Winter have ad-
vanced a claim that liberal Justices crafted standing doctrine as a way to insulate New Deal 
programs from court challenges. See id. at 179–80; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of 
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1455–56 (1988). But 
see Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An 
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 595–96 
(2010) (presenting a more nuanced story to the effect that standing initially had cross-
ideological support, which broke down in the 1920s); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, 
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 691–92 (2004) (compiling 
evidence of eighteenth-century analogs to standing). 
107 Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939); Alexander 
Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 256–57 (1930). 
108 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940) (discussing 47 
U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1940)). 
109 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); see Sunstein, supra note 105, at 185 (noting that “the Data 
Processing Court concluded that a plaintiff no longer needed to show a ‘legal interest’ or 
‘legal injury’ to establish standing. . . . Henceforth the issue would turn on facts, not on 
law.”); accord Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 Va. L. Rev. 
1131, 1161 (2009); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 229–30. Justice Kennedy recently claimed 
(without support) that the injury requirement derived from “the English legal tradition.” 
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441 (2011). Longstanding 
scholarship demonstrates this claim to be unfounded. See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure 
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1274 (1961); accord Sunstein, supra 
note 105, at 171–73. But see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 n.5 
(1998) (arguing that doctrinal standing has a longer historical pedigree). 
110 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 105, at 185. 
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of injury remains opaque,111 contingent on “extremely complex and un-
wieldy threshold issues of fact,”112 and vulnerable to judges’ ad hoc 
normative judgments.113 
B. Standing for the Structural Constitution Under Bond 
Four decades passed after Data Processing before the Court squarely 
addressed individual standing for the structural constitution. Justice 
Kennedy’s unanimous opinion for the Court in the 2011 case of Bond v. 
United States held that individual litigants possess Article III authoriza-
tion to invoke and obtain relief on the basis of structural constitutional 
arguments.114 Justice Kennedy’s resolution of the justiciability question 
in Bond is not without support in standing jurisprudence. I thus begin by 
sketching its result and airing its support. 
Bond arose from criminal charges filed pursuant to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 against Carol Bond, a 
microbiologist who had attempted to poison her husband’s alleged lover 
with 10–chloro10H–phenoxarsine, a chemical with “the rare ability to 
cause toxic harm to individuals through minimal topical contact.”115 Ms. 
 
111 For example, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEPC), the eight-
member Court divided equally on the question of whether states had standing to seek a fed-
eral common law remedy against air pollution, resulting in an affirmance of the circuit 
court’s judgment granting standing. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). The AEPC divide re-
played the sharp disagreement between the Justices over state standing in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498–99, 501 (2007). Taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause chal-
lenges remains another point of sharp contention. Compare Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444–49 
(finding no standing), with id. at 1450–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of stand-
ing). 
112 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Be-
yond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 639 (1999). 
113 See id. at 641 (“What is perceived, socially or legally, as an ‘actual’ injury is a product 
of social or legal categories giving names and recognition to some things that people, promi-
nently people within the legal culture, consider to be (actual, cognizable) harms.”). 
114 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2355 (2011). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a con-
currence without disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning. The Court has since granted Ms. 
Bond’s second certiorari petition concerning the validity of the statute under which she was 
charged as a Treaty Power enactment. 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013). One might query whether Bond 
is a typical example of individual standing for the structural constitution given the Treaty 
Power overlay and the peculiarity of the federal criminal law being invoked in respect to a 
putative chemical weapon. These aspects of the case, however, do not loom large in its reso-
lution of the pure Article III question. 
115 United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2009). Sinister as this sounds, 
Ms. Bond’s efforts appeared to be sophomoric at best. Id. at 132 (“Bond attempted to poison 
Haynes with the chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. She often 
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Bond subsequently challenged the constitutionality of the 1998 Act on 
the theory that it was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment’s reserva-
tion of powers to the states.116 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in-
voked the 1939 Supreme Court opinion Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, which stated that individuals, “absent the 
states or their officers, have no standing” to raise a Tenth Amendment 
question.117 Upon the grant of certiorari review, the U.S. Department of 
Justice switched from arguing that Ms. Bond lacked standing to accept-
ing her Article III bona fides, leaving the Court to appoint an amicus to 
argue against her standing.118 
The Court’s resolution of the standing question in Ms. Bond’s favor 
was brisk and analytically parsimonious. Justice Kennedy began by ob-
serving that as a criminal defendant, Ms. Bond satisfied the formal tri-
partite test for constitutional standing.119 He then dealt with the specific 
precedent cited by the court of appeals. He distinguished Tennessee 
Electric on the ground that it concerned the availability of a cause of ac-
tion, which “‘goes to the merits’ in the typical case, not the justiciability 
of a dispute.”120 Citing Data Processing, Kennedy also rejected the rele-
vance of that merits question to resolution of the injury-in-fact prong of 
standing.121 
 
would spread them on Haynes’s home doorknob, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes no-
ticed the chemicals and usually avoided harm, but on one occasion sustained a chemical burn 
to her thumb.”). 
116 Id. at 134. 
117 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939). The Third Circuit was not alone in reading Tennessee Elec-
tric to bar individual standing in Tenth Amendment cases. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361 (col-
lecting courts of appeal decisions to the same effect). 
118 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361. It is not wholly without irony that the Bond Court would ad-
judicate an Article III question absent the interparty adversity typically thought necessary to 
Article III adjudication. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Con-
trol, and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 692 (2012) (“[W]hat, exactly, is the basis 
for appointing counsel in order to ‘support or defend’ the judgment below? Litigants have 
interests; but judgments? If the litigants have no actual interest in defending the judgment, or 
have abandoned positions taken below, what conception of judicial authority authorizes the 
Court to intervene?”). Given the Court’s sua sponte authority to analyze standing even in the 
absence of a party raising the question, the practice has perhaps more justification in Bond 
than elsewhere. 
119 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361–62; id. at 2366 (“An individual who challenges federal action 
on [structural constitutional] grounds is, of course, subject to the Article III require-
ments . . . .”). 
120 Id. at 2362. 
121 Id. at 2363. 
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Having eliminated the sustaining prop of the opinion below, Justice 
Kennedy turned to the question of prudential standing. He framed the 
analysis as a response to the argument that Ms. Bond was asserting third 
parties’ interests, not her own rights. Rejecting that charge, Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that federalism “protects the liberty of all persons within a 
State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental 
power cannot direct or control their actions,” such that all individuals 
have “a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional 
balance.”122 He added in dicta that “individuals, too, are protected by the 
operations of separation of powers and checks and balances; and they 
are not disabled from relying on those principles in otherwise justiciable 
cases and controversies.”123 Justice Kennedy presented these proposi-
tions as self-evident. Neither was supported by extensive argument or 
citation.124 
Bond comprises an odd amalgam of arguments drawn from distinct 
moments in standing’s history. On the one hand, Justice Kennedy’s ar-
guments depend on a post-Data Processing conception of standing. He 
leveraged the break affected by Data Processing between the “legal in-
jury” test and the “injury-in-fact” regime to reject the Third Circuit’s 
ruling as a relic of a confused and bygone era.125 On the other hand, Jus-
tice Kennedy also argued that “the individual liberty secured by federal-
ism [and, by extension, the separation of powers] is not simply deriva-
tive of the rights of the States.”126 In so doing, he implicitly invoked the 
pre-Data Processing analytic focus upon “legal rights.” Indeed, Kenne-
dy went out of his way to explain that the Constitution does vest indi-
viduals with a direct and unmediated interest in structural constitutional 
values—a kind of “merits” inquiry that, only two brief pages previously, 
 
122 Id. at 2364 (emphasis added); id. (“Federalism secures the freedom of the individual.”). 
123 Id. at 2365. The Court also rejected the Solicitor General’s submission that it should 
distinguish between ultra vires challenges and claims that a federal law interfered with a spe-
cific aspect of state sovereignty. Id. at 2366. 
124 In a brief concurrence, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer invoked the valid rule doctrine as 
a justification for the Court’s holding. Id. at 2367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For the reasons 
developed in Part I, I am skeptical that the valid rule doctrine can explain the Court’s will-
ingness to adjudicate all federalism or separation of powers challenges. 
125 Cf. id. at 2362–63 (majority opinion) (criticizing Tennessee Electric for failing to dis-
tinguish the concepts of standing and a cause of action). But see Sunstein, supra note 112, at 
639 (“As a matter of text and history, the best reading of the Constitution is that no one can 
sue without some kind of cause of action. An injury in fact, however, is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for standing.”). 
126 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
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he had instructed was not to be “conflat[ed]” with standing.127 Bond, 
whatever its other merits may be, thus showcases how the Court can 
toggle promiscuously between different conceptions of standing within 
the same opinion with apparent disregard for analytic coherence. 
III. THE DOCTRINAL TROUBLE WITH BOND 
The Bond Court’s analytic parsimony raises the question whether, 
notwithstanding longstanding judicial practice, the larger aims of stand-
ing doctrine are consonant with individual standing for the structural 
constitution. In this Part, I develop three related arguments to the effect 
that such standing is an outlier in tension with Article III’s larger ambi-
tion. The arguments are related because all derive from a central princi-
ple of Article III: Standing rules should sort out cases and controversies 
that can be resolved without large spillover effects on third parties who 
are unrepresented in the courtroom. To this end, standing doctrine aims 
to roughly categorize litigation based on the magnitude of spillover ef-
fects. The effort in this regard is concededly imprecise, and resulting 
doctrine is plainly both under- and overinclusive. But exceptions are 
cause for embarrassment and judicial retrenchment, not paradigm cases. 
The central claim advanced in this Part is that structural constitutional 
litigation filed by an individual will almost inevitably conflict with this 
core Article III principle. I develop this point by exploring first the 
common law archetype of federal court litigation and showing how its 
doctrinal entailments can be explained as endeavors to avoid cases with 
large spillover effects. A second argument developed in this Part focuses 
on the fact that relief in those structural constitutional cases filed by in-
dividuals often turns on the independent action of an entity not before 
the Court—a form of spillover effect in sharp tension with basic rules of 
causation and redressibility. Finally, the Bond Court endeavored to re-
habilitate individual standing for the structural constitution by pointing 
to a positive spillover effect—call it a liberty externality—from litiga-
tion propelled by individual plaintiffs. This ingenious inversion of ca-
nonical standing doctrine, however, is inconsistent with the observed 
consequences of structural litigation. It therefore provides no support for 
the proper exercise of Article III jurisdiction in such cases. 
 
127 Id. at 2362–63. 
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A. Bond and Article III’s Ambition 
Article III jurisprudence rests on a specific vision of federal courts’ 
proper role, a vision with resonant historical and consequentialist justifi-
cations. Federal courts are tailored to the resolution of disputes in which 
all affected parties are before the court.128 The archetypal suit fit for Ar-
ticle III is a common law tort or contract dispute.129 In contrast, federal 
courts lack institutional competence to resolve disputes involving larger 
numbers of parties, only a portion of whom are properly before the 
bench. Litigation is licensed only if it does not have large externalities, 
or spillovers, onto unrepresented parties.130 To be sure, the Court does 
not pursue this vision of Article III by making case-by-case judgments. 
Instead, it taxonomizes controversies into rough-hewn, imprecisely 
drawn categories. Political pressure or the felt needs of the day also gen-
erate exceptions, such as the class action or structural reform litigation. 
But the Court regards the latter as exceptions, rather than core cases, and 
strives to limit their reach. 
Granting standing to individual litigants seeking to vindicate the 
structural constitution is in sharp tension with this core Article III prin-
ciple. Almost all such disputes inevitably implicate not only parties be-
fore the court, but also a range of other unrepresented actors. Fidelity to 
that core, animating ideal of a well-tailored judiciary therefore generates 
a first reason to think that the practice of individual standing for the 
structural constitution is more constitutionally problematic than the 
Bond Court credited. That is, it is plausible to think that the entire cate-
gory of individual suits to vindicate the structural constitution should be 
kept out of federal court. Through the balance of this Section, I lay out 
this argument in more detail. 
 
128 Cf. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 445 U.S. 375, 382 
(1980) (“The purpose of the case-or-controversy requirement is to limit the business of fed-
eral courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed 
as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
129 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (noting standing’s “common-law” roots); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150–52 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 433, 460–61 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
130 To my knowledge, the Court has never pursued the possibility of Coasean bargaining 
between litigants and affected entities who are not in the courtroom. In effect, such bargain-
ing might be thought to occur in some instances through the use of joinder and interpleader 
rules. Those rules, however, are far from pellucidly clear. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Private 
Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183, 184 (characterizing the relevant rules as 
“underutilized” and “impossible to comprehend”). 
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We can usefully begin with the Constitution’s original design. The 
Framers envisaged a tempered role for federal courts in a constitutional 
republic. “Article III of the Constitution restricts [the federal judiciary] 
to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts.”131 This implies a “bi-
polar model of the lawsuit, which assumes a dispute between two uni-
tary, diametrically opposed interests,” rather than “a multipolar model in 
which the party structure is sprawling and amorphous.”132 Stated other-
wise, Article III aims to select for disputes in which all interested parties 
are before the court, and to exclude from justiciability disputes with non-
trivial spillover effects onto unrepresented parties.133 
In applying this principle, it is salient that the “traditional role of An-
glo-American courts” did not include the resolution of structural gov-
ernance questions at the behest of individual litigants.134 The Court has 
never identified an Anglo-American history of judges policing constitu-
tional structure prior to the Revolution.135 It simply would not have oc-
curred to those seeking institutional reform in pre-1789 Britain to turn to 
the courts for relief. The same is true in the United States. At least until 
the beginning of the twentieth century, there was no American judicial 
tradition of enforcing structural constitutionalism (or, for that matter, 
any expansive tradition of judicial review) upon which the Justices could 
draw to legitimate such actions.136 Viewed from a historical baseline, 
 
131 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 (2009). 
132 Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 227, 250 (1990); Maxwell L. 
Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 875, 915 (2008) (“By demanding ‘injury in fact,’ ‘causation,’ and ‘redressa-
bility,’ standing doctrine seeks a set of factors that correlate to traditional bipolar litiga-
tion.”). 
133 The notion of “relevant” spillover effects has been developed formally by James M. 
Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371, 374 (1962). I do not 
try here to provide a formal definition of when precisely spillovers are great enough to raise 
Article III concerns. The concept is, in practice, only poorly specified.  
134 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148. 
135 Even if England had separation of powers or federalism to police, its principal courts 
were in their origins instruments of the Crown. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English 
Legal History 37–51 (4th ed. 2007). Even prerogative writs issued by the King’s bench, such 
as habeas corpus, “did not result from a contest between ‘executive’ and judicial bodies” or 
create any “checking and balancing” at least until the early 1600s. Paul D. Halliday, Habeas 
Corpus: From England to Empire 27 (2010). 
136 Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 579, 584–86 
(2012) (summarizing path of judicial review from 1800 to 2000). Famously, Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803), states that the 
function of a federal court “is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.” See also Mas-
sachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484 (1923) (“It is only where the rights of persons or 
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therefore, judicial superintendence of structural constitutional principles 
at the behest of an individual plaintiff is a novelty that may “risk[] in-
jecting the judiciary prematurely in decisions that are not its to make.”137 
That “Anglo-American” template for judicial power reflects not only 
historical continuities but also important consequentialist concerns. Spe-
cifically, it embodies an abiding concern with judges’ limited institu-
tional competence by selecting for judicial resolution only those catego-
ries of dispute in which all (or most) relevant parties are before the 
court, while at the same time screening out disputes that entangle a scat-
tered multitude of actors who cannot reasonably be brought before the 
court.138 The latter kind of dispute is oft thought better suited for resolu-
tion by democratically elected political branches because of the presence 
of externalities that judges are ill-positioned to gauge empirically or to 
address. Legislatures and executives, by contrast, are thought to be bet-
ter able to gather diverse and plural popular inputs, and also thought to 
possess larger institutional resources for managing disputes with com-
plex and widely entangling spillover effects.139 “Slow, cumbersome, and 
unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be,”140 it re-
mains the default forum for deliberation and national policymaking 
about matters that touch on many parties. By preserving this institutional 
prerogative of the elected branches, Article III further allocates the 
scarce adjudicative resources of the federal judiciary to their highest 
 
property are involved, and when such rights can be presented under some judicial form of 
proceedings, that courts of justice can interpose relief.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
137 Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 106, at 733. Different considerations arguably apply 
when the structural dispute is raised by the branches or governments involved. In those cas-
es, the role of the federal judiciary as a supposedly neutral body, and the need to provide ex-
peditious resolution of intergovernmental disputes in a way that does not generate gridlock, 
may well justify a different result notwithstanding the absence of historical antecedents. 
138 See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 459, 477 (2008) 
(“[T]he Court has suggested that mere numerosity creates a standing problem.”). 
139 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (“Whether styled as a constitutional or pru-
dential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of 
Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide 
the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.”); accord Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95, 111–12 (1983); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208, 222 (1974); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (noting that standing “is 
founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a demo-
cratic society”). Some commentators argue that the Court has been too aggressive in screen-
ing out cases that could properly be resolved by a court. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 138, at 
474–75, 483–92. 
140 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
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value use: categories of dispute that do not involve such spillovers, 
which can be fully resolved with only a handful of parties haled into 
court.141 
Reflecting these historical, pro-democracy, and efficiency founda-
tions, the “anti-externality” template of Article III jurisdiction under-
writes both the injury-in-fact rule and the correlative doctrinal skepti-
cism of generalized grievances of “an abstract and indefinite nature.”142 
Both of the latter are efforts to pick out those classes of disputes that 
lack unmanageable spillovers. Hence, it is not the case that injuries in 
fact are defined exogenously to the law. Rather, the Court must exercise 
judgment in determining when to single out consequences as harms cog-
nizable under Article III.143 In the course of this fundamentally norma-
tive enterprise, the Court has mounted resistance to any conception of 
injury in fact that opens the courtroom door to cases with large externali-
ties and thus transforms litigation into a substitute forum for far-reaching 
and complex policy change. It has used the injury-in-fact rule, in other 
words, to resist jurisdiction over multipolar disputes. 
Consistent with that aspiration, Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife cautioned against allowing “Congress to convert the undifferen-
tiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into 
an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts.”144 To that end, he repudi-
ated legislative efforts to create “individual rights” from “public rights 
that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual 
who forms part of the public.”145 Absent such constraint, Scalia posited, 
 
141 In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 191 
(2000), the Court expressed the aim that “the scarce resources of the federal courts are de-
voted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.” The argument in the main 
text is similar, but not quite the same as Laidlaw’s point.  
142 Akins, 524 U.S. at 23. In the administrative law context, the Court has pressed the same 
distinction between general laws and specifically targeted adjudications. See Bi-Metallic Inv. 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915). 
143 See Sunstein, supra note 105, at 188–89 (“In classifying some harms as injuries in fact 
and other harms as purely ideological, courts must inevitably rely on some standard that is 
normatively laden and independent of facts.” (footnote omitted)); accord Gene R. Nichol, Jr., 
Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1915, 1918 (1986) (noting that 
the injury-in-fact analysis “carries two distinct inquiries under its broad mantle. Injury analy-
sis demands the exploration of not only the directness or actuality of the litigant’s claimed 
injury, but also the judicial cognizability of the interest alleged to be injured.”); Fletcher, su-
pra note 1, at 232–33 (same).  
144 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. 
145 Id. at 578. Or, as Justice Scalia put the matter in another section of his Lujan opinion, 
the “public interest in proper administration of the laws [cannot be] converted into an indi-
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individual litigants (with congressional aid) could transform Article III 
courts into generalized “monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Exec-
utive action.”146 This would yield misuse of “a branch designed not to 
protect the public at large but to protect individual rights.”147 A strait-
ened version of injury in fact, in short, conduces to the appropriate allo-
cation of institutional responsibilities: Courts resolve the category of 
disputes where all relevant parties can be haled before the bench, where-
as the elected branches resolve entangling and amorphous disputes char-
acterized by large spillover effects. 
Individual standing for the structural constitution disregards these his-
torical, pro-democracy, and consequentialist entailments of Article III. 
Such standing is fundamentally and unavoidably multipolar and sprawl-
ing in nature. Correlatively, it almost inevitably generates unmanageable 
spillovers to unrepresented parties. It is thus precisely the sort of dispute 
about the “wisdom and soundness” of molar institutional arrangements 
that Article III is designed to shut out categorically from the federal 
courthouse. Hence the awkward fit between the narrowly defined proce-
dural channels of a federal criminal trial and the large, structural ques-
tions handled in cases such as Lopez and Bond. 
This point can be developed further by comparing individual standing 
in constitutional rights cases with individual standing for the structural 
constitution. In individual rights matters, a judge’s core task involves 
balancing an individual’s constitutional privilege against the aggregated 
interests of society at large as represented by the government.148 Under-
stood in such terms, constitutional rights litigation draws in all relevant 
parties to the courthouse. Indeed, a central assumption for judicial re-
view in the rights context is the idea that the parties with the most at 
stake are almost always in the courtroom. In contrast, when that is not 
 
vidual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that 
matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue.” Id. at 576–77. 
146 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
147 Akins, 524 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Akins, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opin-
ion objected to the broad availability of relief Congress had enabled under the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act, see 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2006), to seek information about political com-
mittees. Id. at 30 (describing the statutory framework). In a separate concurrence in Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 636 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring), 
he pressed further on the same point by arguing that the institutional sorting function of 
standing precluded the judicial vindication of “[p]sychic [i]njur[ies].”  
148 The Court must also consider decision costs—that is, whether the proposed rule is one 
that can be operationalized effectively by judges. I bracket decision costs in the following 
analysis since they largely wash out. 
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so—when rights adjudication risks excessive spillover effects—the 
Court declines to find claims justiciable.149 
To be sure, judicial review in rights cases cannot be justified upon the 
assertion that such adjudication lacks externalities entirely. This is plain-
ly not so. Rather, polycentricism is arguably endemic to constitutional 
rights litigation. Every time the Court defines or refines a criminal pro-
cedure-related right pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments, 
for example, its decision not only has consequences for specific defend-
ants and prosecutors. It also has spillover effects upon almost all mem-
bers of the polity when a new rule renders crime-control either more 
costly or less expensive.150 From this perspective, any push to cabin Ar-
ticle III litigation to instances in which there are no spillovers is whis-
tling in the wind.151 
But this kind of skepticism moves too fast. In the rights context, the 
state or federal government is typically on the other side of the court-
room from the rights claimant. In its litigation capacity, the government 
is not typically asserting solely its own institutional interests. Rather, 
government lawyers seek to vindicate a law by pointing to some set of 
“compelling interests”152 belonging to society at large. In this way, the 
government defendant in a rights case is meant to aggregate into man-
ageable form the plurality of social interests contrary to a right, and 
 
149 For example, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970), the Court rejected a 
constitutional entitlement to social welfare payments because of the complex interdependen-
cies of any such right and its effect on parties not present in the courtroom: “Conflicting 
claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every 
measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and 
even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the 
business of this Court.” In an insightful new book, Professor Emily Zackin demonstrates that 
positive rights are often included in state constitutions, but judicial review is not necessarily 
central to their realization. See Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: 
Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights 11–12 (2013). 
150 This is an important theme in the work of Professor William Stuntz. See, e.g., William 
J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
Yale L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (“As courts have raised the cost of criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce those costs.”); see also William J. Stuntz, 
The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 793 (2006) (“The 
government pays for criminal procedure rules in the coin of forgone arrests and convictions. 
When a particular rule turns winning cases into losers, prosecutors seek substitutes . . . .”). 
151 For critique in this vein, see Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and Optimal Targeting, 120 
Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1148 (2007) (“Deeply embedded in the conventional legal mindset is a 
common law model of adjudication and liability premised on the ideal of bilateral corrective 
justice. . . . From an economic perspective, every element of this model is dubious.”). 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012). 
HUQ_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013 6:23 PM 
2013] Standing for the Structural Constitution 1471 
bring them before the court. This is most obviously so in respect to the 
Solicitor General, who represents the United States in the Supreme 
Court, and who is expected to operate as a “Tenth Justice,” impartially 
and objectively aggregating relevant social interests and presenting them 
to the court.153 The Solicitor General’s office, moreover, plays that role 
even if a state is the formal litigant.154 Because the Court can assume 
that the government will aggregate relevant social interests, it is entitled 
to assume that there are no absent stakeholders, and hence a tolerable 
cap upon spillover effects. 
Contrast this with structural constitutional litigation. Here, judges aim 
to strike the constitutionally desirable balance between the branches or 
between the states and the federal government. Adjudicating between 
the states and the federal government, the Court strives to preserve a 
“federal balance” involving a plurality of institutional actors.155 That 
balance must reflect judges’ efforts to guard against no less than “three 
types of transgressions”: shirking by states, burden-shifting by states on-
to other states, and encroachment by the national government.156 Simi-
larly, in the context of horizontal interbranch relations, the Court does 
not simply strive to maximize the power of Congress or the President. 
Instead, the Court understands the “[s]eparation of powers” as “se-
cur[ing] a proper balance of legislative, executive, and judicial authori-
ty.”157 Again, this presumes that the Court must be attentive to multiple 
species of constitutional violation implicating the interests of plural par-
ties—infringements on legislative power, on executive power, or on ju-
dicial authority—rather than simply striking to maximize one value. 
 
153 For useful articulations of this function, see Drew S. Days III, The Solicitor General 
and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L. Rev. 73, 76–79 (1995); Drew S. Days III, When 
the President Says “No”: A Few Thoughts on Executive Power and the Tradition of Solicitor 
General Independence, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 509, 514–17 (2001). 
154 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive 
Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676, 706–07 (2005) (noting frequency with which the Solicitor 
General intervenes in both high court and lower court litigation). 
155 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
156 Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design 68–69 (2009). Others de-
scribe federalism as involving reciprocal risks of self-dealing by the states and the national 
government. See, e.g., Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Fed-
eralism, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 103, 104 (2005) (describing the “twin dilemmas” of federal-
ism). 
157 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The 
executive shares this view. See The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Consti-
tutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 276 (1980) (rejecting legal 
stances that “could jeopardize the equilibrium established within our constitutional system”). 
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Employing either formalist or functionalist tools, the Court hence aims 
to strike an equilibrium among the branches that honors a gamut of con-
stitutional interests held by diverse parties.158 In both federalism and 
separation of powers contexts, that is, the constitutional relations rele-
vant to the litigation tend to have more than two nodes and tend to pit a 
plurality of institutions against each other in diverse ways. 
In this light, it is apparent that structural constitutional jurisprudence 
initiated by a private plaintiff possesses an inexorably multipolar charac-
ter quite distinct in character from individual rights litigation. This is not 
solely because structural constitutional cases tend to implicate questions 
of “broad social import,”159 in that they alter institutions impinging on 
the lives of many (although this is certainly so). It is more importantly a 
result of the fact that when an individual litigant brings an action to vin-
dicate the structural constitution, it is almost certain that not all constitu-
tionally salient actors will have a formal role in the ensuing litigation.160 
An individual plaintiff typically hales only one institutional actor into 
court as a defendant; others are not directly voiced in the courtroom 
even if their powers and prerogatives are forthrightly imperiled. 
The underlying substantive question of federalism in Bond, for exam-
ple, concerned not merely an individual defendant and the federal execu-
tive, but also the several states—which were not parties to the case. Sim-
ilarly, Lopez, Morrison, and National Federation of Independent 
Business all presented multipolar disputes between individuals, the 
states, and Congress—not all of whom were involved in framing the liti-
gation and developing its evidentiary foundations. Further, Free Enter-
prise Fund entangled not only an (unwilling) executive, but also impli-
cated Congress’s authority under the horizontal component of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to design federal agencies to achieve de-
 
158 Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690–91 (1988) (engaging in functionalist 
analysis), with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725–27 (1986) (using a formalist analysis). 
The formalist analysis seeks to identify and assign categories of powers to create equilibri-
um, whereas functionalists aim to make contextualized judgments about how to maintain 
some rough equality of arms between branches. 
159 Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979). 
160 To be sure, states or branches can file amicus briefs, as they commonly do. (Executive 
participation via the Solicitor General is familiar fare, but for studies of Congress and the 
states, see respectively Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan, Congressional Participation as 
Amicus Curiae Before the U.S. Supreme Court 1–3 (2005), and Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends 
of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making 1–15 (2008)). But this 
does not provide them with the same ability to control the course of the litigation, introduce 
issues, or present evidence as if they were parties to the litigation. 
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sired policy outcomes, catalyzing a peculiar situation in which the exec-
utive was adverse to a litigant whose claim depended on the President’s 
own possession of a prerogative power.161 Even accepting Bond’s claim 
that structural principles directly benefit individuals,162 any litigation in 
which an individual seeks to vindicate a structural constitutional interest 
will accordingly have complex repercussions for diverse institutional ac-
tors who likely will not all be before the court. Such cases almost always 
run afoul of Article III’s core wisdom of sorting for cases without persis-
tent and unmanageable externalities. 
In contrast, suits lodged by the primary institutional beneficiary of a 
structural constitutional principle—say, by the states against an over-
bearing federal government, or by a congressional committee against re-
calcitrant executive officials—do not necessarily present the same spill-
over problems. Separation of powers disputes between Congress and the 
executive may well bring to the bench the most interested parties. Where 
all states agree that a federal enactment goes too far, a lawsuit filed by a 
state does not have intrinsic spillover effects. When the states are divid-
ed, and only some seek injunctive relief against a law, however, the pos-
sibility that unrepresented states have adverse interests that will not be 
aired in litigation might properly give a federal judge pause. 
The disconnect between Article III’s fundamental ambition and indi-
vidual standing for the structural constitution is further evident from the 
interpretations of the injury-in-fact rule that the Court offers in cases 
such as Bond, Free Enterprise Fund, Lopez, and Chadha. All, in Justice 
Scalia’s elegant locution, fashion “individual rights” from “public 
rights.”163 So even as the Court resists congressional attempts to turn 
federal judges into “monitors of the wisdom and soundness” of govern-
ment policy,164 it has done precisely the same thing itself by permitting 
individual litigants to assert not only their own privileges, but also the 
polity’s collective interest in structural principles. 
A defender of individual standing for the structural constitution might 
offer two rejoinders to these arguments. First, she might point to mecha-
nisms such as the class action and structural reform litigation as instanc-
es of complex, multipolar lawsuits that remain within the bounds of Ar-
 
161 For an extended analysis of the complex consequences of Free Enterprise Fund, see 
Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2013). 
162 But see infra text accompanying notes 237–71 (casting doubt on that claim).  
163 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
164 Tatum, 408 U.S. at 15.  
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ticle III. She might infer that multipolar litigation initiated by an indi-
vidual plaintiff for the structural constitution implicates no greater con-
cern. And, indeed, the point is a fair one: Article III does not seem to 
screen out all instances in which there are spillovers or where interested 
parties are, either de facto or de jure, unrepresented. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to make too much of these exceptions. Class actions, after 
all, are understood to be “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”165 
They are also now “on the ropes” after a series of recent Supreme Court 
and lower court decisions ratcheting up the threshold hurdles to class 
certification.166 Structural reform litigation is also on the wane even in 
its classical loci: prisons167 and schools.168 Further, federal judges in-
creasingly resist through lobbying and public protestations any novel 
expansions of federal remedial power.169 Exceptions to the narrow, gen-
erally bilateral terms of Article III’s common law template thus are in-
creasingly frowned upon and formally cabined. They are exceptions in 
search of special dispensation, not models for the balance of the federal 
docket. 
Second, our critic might observe that legislative creation of litigable 
individual interests out of the amorphous stuff of broadly shared public 
interests implicates a different and more pressing cluster of separation-
of-powers concerns than analogous judicial action. Therefore, judicial 
superintendence of disputes that would otherwise be resolved by the po-
litical process possesses no great constitutional concern. To support this 
argument, the critic would flag the Founding-era stipulation that Con-
gress presents more of a threat to the autonomous operation of the exec-
 
165 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasa-
ki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). 
166 Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623, 658 (2012); accord Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 
104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 375 (2005) (“[I]t is likely that, with a handful of exceptions, class 
actions will soon be virtually extinct.”). 
167 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litiga-
tion Against the Government, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 617, 661 (2003). A striking recent coun-
terexample is Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1910–11 (2011). 
168 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 Ca-
lif. L. Rev. 1387, 1410–11 (2007). 
169 See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924, 949–99 (2000) (collecting examples). 
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utive than the courts.170 And the Court has duly worried about legislative 
infringement on the president’s power to “take Care” that the laws are 
enforced.171 
But the judicial transformation of public rights into individual inter-
ests in Bond, Free Enterprise Fund, Lopez, and Chadha may be no less 
troubling than congressional efforts along that margin. Judicial, no less 
than legislative, expansions of standing shrink the ambit of executive 
discretion and hence impinge upon democratically informed decision 
making. Moreover, “separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally fo-
cuses on the danger of one branch’s aggrandizing its power at the ex-
pense of another branch.”172 That the Justices are effectively expanding 
their own authority, and in effect engaging in institutional self-dealing, 
suggests the judicial power to transubstantiate public rights into individ-
ual interests should be even more sharply cabined than any parallel con-
gressional authority. 
B. Reconsidering Causation and Redressibility 
The second reason to hesitate before embracing Bond’s expansive 
view of individual standing for the structural constitution turns on the 
balance of the doctrinal test for constitutional standing.173 In Bond, the 
presence of the three canonical elements of constitutional standing—
injury, causation, and redressibility—were tolerably clear given the un-
derlying proceeding’s criminal complexion. This is not so in every case 
in which an individual litigant invokes structural constitutionalism. In a 
substantial portion of such actions, the causal link between injury and 
judicial redress is not confined to the four corners of the case, but spills 
over so as to implicate the contingent, independent decisions of third 
parties. This distinct form of spillover, which places third parties in an 
intermediating role, renders the formal doctrinal elements of causation 
and redressibility uncertain. Elsewhere, this suffices to derail Article III 
standing. It should do so here too. 
In Allen v. Wright, for example, the Court held that a nationwide class 
of African-American parents could not challenge the Internal Revenue 
 
170 The Federalist No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987) (“In republican 
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”). 
171 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. 
172 Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991) (citing Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989)). 
173 See supra text accompanying note 98.  
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Service’s (“IRS”) failure to deny tax-exempt status to racially discrimi-
natory schools.174 The plaintiffs complained about the federal govern-
ment’s failure to cease subsidizing private schools, which provided exit 
opportunities from desegregating public school systems and thereby di-
minished African-American children’s “ability to receive an education 
in a racially integrated school.”175 Dismissing the suit on standing 
grounds, the Allen Court pointed to the “numerous third parties (officials 
of racially discriminatory schools receiving tax exemptions and the par-
ents of children attending such schools)” as ruptures in the causal chain 
from the IRS to the plaintiffs.176 Because the Court thought that the 
causal pathway upon which the Allen plaintiffs relied exceeded the 
bounds of Article III, and implicated third parties, it declined to find 
standing. 
Allen framed its analysis in terms of causation.177 Substantially the 
same point about causal spillovers can be reprised in the idiom of re-
dressibility. In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Court denied stand-
ing to Ohio taxpayers challenging property tax abatements and invest-
ment tax credits granted to an automobile manufacturer on the ground 
that any remedy “depends on how legislators respond to [the] reduction 
in revenue” caused by judicial intervention.178 Citing the Cuno decision 
some five years later, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to an Arizona education-tax-credit scheme on the ground that in-
validating it would require speculation that Arizona lawmakers would 
respond by passing along fiscal savings to taxpayers, as opposed to allo-
cating them elsewhere in the state’s budget.179 Again, the core objection 
 
174 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984). 
175 Id. at 756; cf. Christopher Coleman et al., Social Movements and Social-Change Litiga-
tion: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 663, 687 n.153 (2005) 
(describing Alabama’s 1956 change of its constitution to facilitate white flight to private 
schools as a means to thwart public school desegregation). 
176 Allen, 468 U.S. at 759; accord Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 & n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opin-
ion) (identifying third-party intermediation as a barrier to Article III standing); Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40–46 (1976) (same). 
177 To be sure, there may be a sound explanation for Allen if the older legal rights concept 
of standing were accepted (that is, that the plaintiffs in that case did not have a legal right 
embodied in the federal tax code). I do not mean to deny that possibility, but aim here to 
draw attention to a different feature of the case’s logic. I also do not mean to suggest that I 
agree with the outcome in Allen, only that it is part of standing’s doctrinal heritage. 
178 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006). The Cuno Court also evinced sensitivity to the “broad discre-
tion” of state fiscal policymakers—a discretion it did not wish to crimp. Id. at 345. 
179 Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 (2011). 
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to standing in that case turned on causal spillovers and the role third par-
ties played in connecting the challengers’ harm to the court’s potential 
remedy. 
Third-party intermediation of the harm alleged to flow from structural 
constitutional wrongs occurs in many separation-of-powers cases.180 
Consider Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board. According to the Court, the organic statute of the PCAOB 
was unconstitutional because its members could be removed only by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and then only on a show-
ing of good cause, whereas SEC commissioners could be removed by 
the White House only on a showing of good cause.181 This “dual for-
cause” regime created a buffer between PCAOB and the President that, 
the Court held, conflicted with the promise of democratic accountability 
immanent in Article II of the Constitution.182 To remedy this constitu-
tional flaw, the Court invalidated one level of for-cause protection, leav-
ing the SEC with plenary removal authority over PCAOB members.183 
The Court did not, however, explain how this intervention redressed 
the plaintiff accounting firm’s injury in fact—that is, the prospect of an 
imminent investigation. Absent some cause to conclude that a marginal 
shift in political control would influence the Board’s enforcement strate-
gies, there is no reason to believe the Free Enterprise Fund plaintiffs 
were even incrementally differently situated after prevailing in the 
Court. Whether they benefit depends wholly on how the SEC—a third 
party which was not formally a litigant in the proceedings—behaves. It 
is “unjustifiable economic and political speculation”184 to assume the 
SEC will change tack once it has greater control of PCAOB. Yet the 
Court’s finding of standing in that case requires precisely such specula-
tion.185  
 
180 To be clear, the same difficulty with constitutional causation does not appear to arise in 
federalism cases. 
181 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). 
182 Id. at 3151. 
183 Id. at 3161–62. 
184 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1443. 
185 In other cases, the Court has been willing to engage in such speculation. In Metropoli-
tan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 
(“MWAA”), for example, the Court invalidated the transfer of Washington National Airport 
to the control of a regional authority on the theory that a mixed executive-legislative board 
that had a veto power over any transfer had influenced the airport’s disposition. 501 U.S. 
252, 265 (1991) (stating because “invalidation of the [board’s] veto power will prevent the 
enactment of the master plan [to which plaintiffs objected],” Article III standing was ob-
HUQ_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013 6:23 PM 
1478 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:1435 
Notice that this uncertainty also seeps into and corrodes the causation 
prong of standing. It is far from clear in Free Enterprise Fund how any 
alleged Article II error caused the asserted injury in fact. To be sure, it is 
perfectly clear that the limitation on presidential removal authority at is-
sue in the case was part of PCAOB’s original statutory design. But this 
does not mean the removal-related rule was a cause, in any but the most 
etiolated and ethereal sense of that elusive word, of the plaintiff account-
ing firm’s worries.186 
Or consider the Court’s invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v. 
Chadha.187 Mr. Chadha sought federal court relief because of the legisla-
tive repudiation of an immigration judge’s discretionary grant of an im-
migration benefit termed suspension of deportation.188 On first blush, the 
Chadha decision seems unlike Free Enterprise Fund in that the judg-
ment directly benefited the individual claimant. Chadha, that is, effec-
tively erected the separation of powers as a shield against coercive fed-
eral action. Formally then, the causation and redressibility requirements 
were satisfied. 
Nevertheless, the legislative veto decision is not the victory for struc-
tural constitutional principles that it first appears to be. Although Mr. 
Chadha obtained relief, a similarly situated litigant pressing an identical 
claim (or even another Mr. Chadha in a hypothetical later stage of his 
litigation) might not.189 Post-Chadha studies demonstrate that Congress 
continued to include legislative vetoes in the text of federal legislation, 
and to employ them through informal means such as hearings and meet-
ings with agency officials in order to influence those agencies.190 Hence, 
 
tained). The holding in MWAA is problematic insofar as it relies on unsupported supposition 
about the likely future actions of nonparties. Unlike Free Enterprise Fund, the MWAA Court 
cannot be condemned for eliding the standing question entirely. 
186 The same point can be made about Morrison v. Olsen, in which the Court considered 
the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel statute under the Ethics in Government Act 
at the behest of an individual under investigation. 487 U.S. 654, 654–55 (1988). What war-
rant did the Morrison Court have, one might query, for presuming, even arguendo, that in-
validation of the Independent Counsel statute would have led to abandonment, rather than 
reassignment, of the investigation? This surely depended on the decision of then-Attorney 
General Reno, another third party. 
187 462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983). 
188 Id. at 924–59 (discussing application of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) to Mr. Chadha’s case). 
189 Given the posture of Mr. Chadha’s immigration proceeding when it reached the Su-
preme Court, it appears that no further proceedings were available in which Congress could 
renew its objection through informal channels. 
190 See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 273, 275, 288 (1993); accord Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation: American Con-
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Congress maintained effectual power after Chadha to secure precisely 
the same outcomes, albeit through informal channels. By failing to at-
tend to the broader institutional context and in particular to ongoing in-
teractions between the immigration service and Congress, the Court 
scored a largely illusory victory for structural constitutionalism, and thus 
for individuals facing liberty deprivations analogous to Mr. Chadha’s. 
By focusing narrowly on the interaction between Mr. Chadha and the 
agency—one interrupted by the illicit operation of the legislative veto—
the Court failed to account for the myriad other entanglements between 
Congress and the immigration agency that complicate and neutralize 
Chadha’s holding beyond the four walls of the litigation.191 Due to this 
inattention, a gap opens between the consequences of the decision for 
the individual plaintiff, and the consequences for the structural constitu-
tional principle putatively at stake. What benefits the individual litigant, 
in short, need not yield reinforcement of the structural constitution.192 
 
stitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto 13 (1996) (arguing that “the legislative 
veto shortcut was inconsequential to congressional control of the policymaking process”). 
191 Another way of making the same point is by noticing that the immigration judge’s deci-
sion respecting Mr. Chadha’s case was already partially caused by an anticipation of con-
gressional exercise of the legislative veto. The judge acted within a clearly defined and se-
quenced institutional context. In that context, the specter of a legislative veto necessarily 
factored into that judge’s reasoning. His or her use of discretion must have accounted for that 
downstream possibility. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 613, 643−64 (1991) (describ-
ing the dynamic of anticipatory responses in a sequential game); see also Barry R. Weingast 
& Mark. J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policy-
making by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 765 (1983). A rational judge 
would, in expectation, grant relief more of the time if he or she knows that some of those 
orders will be reversed. It follows that in the absence of the legislative veto, we cannot be 
certain that Mr. Chadha’s initial immigration benefit would even have been granted. The 
Court, in other words, eliminated both a potent cause of, as well as a potential barrier to, the 
discretionary boon that was the basis of Mr. Chadha’s injury in fact. The Court does not, to 
be sure, account for such counterfactual causal considerations in standing doctrine, but that 
makes them no less practically significant. To see this, imagine a fixed class of immigrants 
situated similarly to Mr. Chadha. Say that under the legislative veto regime, one-third obtain 
discretionary relief, whereas without it one-sixth obtain such relief, even though Congress’s 
use of the veto is in fact sporadic. After the Court’s intervention, fewer individual litigants 
situated similarly to Mr. Chadha will secure the benefit. The class as a whole, that is, may 
well be worse off than before the judicial intervention. 
192 Another example of the complex and unintended effects of judicial intervention con-
cerns the line-item veto, which was invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 
438–39. A dynamic model of interbranch bargaining suggests that a veto “designed to reduce 
the bargaining incentives that lead to pork barrel legislation . . . is more likely simply to 
change the players in that process” by making the President a more influential participant in 
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The causal fragility I have identified here is perhaps an inevitable 
consequence of the shift achieved in Data Processing from a “legal 
right” test to an “injury-in-fact” inquiry in structural constitutional cases. 
In the latter cases, remedies for institutional problems will be conceptu-
ally orthogonal to the specific harms being mustered for Article III pur-
poses. The problem is less likely to arise in the individual rights context, 
where the remedy and the harm will typically arise out of the same tight-
ly defined set of circumstances. The net result is a line of structural con-
stitutional precedent resting on strained or implausible accounts of Arti-
cle III causation and redressibility. 
C. Structural Constitutional Litigation as a Means to Promote 
Individual Liberty 
The final doctrinal argument against individual standing for structural 
constitutional flaws draws on the putative link between federalism and 
the separation of powers on the one hand, and individual liberty on the 
other. Somewhat ironically, given the spillover-limiting aspirations of 
standing doctrine, it is an instance of the Court relying upon a positive 
externality—the production of liberty—to warrant Article III standing. 
Here, my argument is that the Court’s claim about positive externalities 
fails to withstand scrutiny. Even if Article III standing could be sus-
tained on a doctrinally novel theory of positive externalities, the under-
lying causal claim here fails. 
In Bond, Justice Kennedy asserted that “[f]ederalism secures the free-
dom of the individual,” such that all individuals have “a direct interest in 
objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance.”193 Kennedy thus 
implied a strong, monotonic relationship between structural constitu-
tionalism and individual liberty, here conceived as a positive spillover, 
sufficient to satisfy Article III standing criteria. There are two reasons, 
however, for thinking this assertion cannot redeem individual standing 
for the structural constitution. The first accepts the notion that structural 
constitutionalism promotes liberty whereas the second challenges it.  
 
initial budget negotiations. Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item 
Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, 417 (1992). 
193 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
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1. Indirect Beneficiaries and Standing 
As an initial matter, the Court has consistently resisted the idea that 
indirect beneficiaries of the exercise of a legal right have access to a 
federal forum.194 A quarter century ago, now-Judge William Fletcher in-
voked the “numbingly familiar” idea that standing “ensur[es] that the 
people most directly concerned are able to litigate the questions at is-
sue.”195 Judicial resistance to third-party standing means that some per-
sons with arguable injuries in fact are not allowed access to the courts on 
the ground that it is not their interest at stake,196 despite having what, in 
lay terms, seems a sharply defined, personally immediate interest. Con-
sider Whitmore v. Arkansas, in which the Court held that a death row 
inmate lacked standing to challenge the execution of another inmate be-
cause the killing would affect the outcome of his own case under the 
state’s “system of comparative review in death penalty cases.”197 A mere 
change in the “odds” of relief, Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted, did not 
suffice for standing purposes for an individual only indirectly affected 
by the challenged act.198 
The rule against third-party standing has historical form. In a 1912 
case involving the Yazoo Railroad, the Court denied standing to rail-
roads challenging a state statute when the allegedly unconstitutional ap-
plications of the statute were not before the Court.199 The Court has justi-
fied this permutation on the third-party standing bar as a way to 
“avoi[d] . . . the adjudication of rights which those not before the Court 
 
194 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (describing “limitations on a liti-
gant’s assertion of jus tertii” but noting they are not “constitutionally mandated”). 
195 Fletcher, supra note 1, at 222 (emphasis added); id. at 243–47 (criticizing the “apparent 
lawlessness” of third-party standing). 
196 That is, the bar to third-party standing can be understood as a residue of the pre-Data 
Processing “legal right” regime. Not only must a litigant show they have been harmed, they 
must also identify a legal interest linked to that harm. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
197 495 U.S. 149, 156 (1990). The Arkansas Supreme Court engages in a comparative re-
view of each capital penalty against earlier death penalty cases to assure itself of a sentence’s 
proportionality. See, e.g., Whitmore v. State, 756 S.W.2d 890, 895 (Ark. 1988). Arkansas is 
one of a handful of states that “regularly impose[s] death sentences and carr[ies] out execu-
tions.” David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
42 (2010). 
198 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157. In other instances, probabilistic gains have sufficed for 
standing purposes. See, e.g., Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) 
(holding that loss of mere opportunity to compete on equal terms, without any guarantee of 
concrete gain, suffices for standing). 
199 Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912). 
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may not wish to assert, and the assurance that the most effective advo-
cate of the rights at issue is present to champion them.”200 Constraining 
third-party standing also serves to further the goals of the injury-in-fact 
rule and the bar on generalized grievances—thereby sorting disputes ac-
cording to their amenability to resolution via judicial or political pro-
cess.201 
Well aware of this jurisprudence, the Bond Court characterized indi-
viduals as “direct” beneficiaries of the structural constitution.202 This is, 
of course, not literally the case. Without reiterating the arguments aired 
in Section I.B, it suffices here to note how much of a linguistic and ana-
lytic stretch it is to say that vertical and horizontal disaggregations of au-
thority between branches and governments directly vest individuals with 
something akin to a right homologous to the First or Fourth Amend-
ment. Neither ordinary English usage nor familiar legal custom supports 
such an undifferentiated, lumpy view of our constitutional system. In his 
canonical account of the separation of powers, Madison hence speaks of 
the need to “oblige [government] to control itself,” through the “di-
vi[sion] and arrange[ment] [of] the several officers in such a manner, as 
that each may be a check on the other.”203 It is the branches (and the 
states) that are the legally empowered agents in Madison’s account, not 
the general citizenry.204 
Instead, Justice Kennedy’s undernourished assertion might perhaps be 
glossed as a supposition about the intent of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion. Consistent with this view, Kennedy began his Bond analysis by 
 
200 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); accord Single-
ton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976). The Court has also expressed concern about the 
need to “consider every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the application 
of complex and comprehensive legislation” and the bar on advisory opinions. United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1960) (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256 
(1953)). 
201 Professor Monaghan has argued that “[m]any third party standing cases ought to be un-
derstood in first party terms: the litigant is simply asserting a violation of his [or her] own 
right to be regulated in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule.” Monaghan, Third-
Party Standing, supra note 70, at 282. As Part I explained, I am skeptical of the elucidating 
power of the valid rule doctrine. 
202 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
203 The Federalist No. 51, at 286–87 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, For-
esman & Co. 1898) (internal quotation marks omitted). I do not claim that this is Madison’s 
only strategy for vindicating individual rights, but it is the only one at stake here. 
204 Indeed, Madison was famously cautious about the efficacy of individual rights. See 
Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 
325–26 (1996) (discussing Madison’s and the Federalists’ skepticism of bills of rights). 
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stating that the “Framers concluded that allocation of powers between 
the National Government and the States enhances freedom.”205 He then 
identified individuals as “intended beneficiaries” of structural constitu-
tionalism.206 Elaborating the range of benefits that flow to citizens, Jus-
tice Kennedy identified federalism’s consequences for democracy, inno-
vation, and government responsiveness.207 But this does little to address 
the problem: Justice Kennedy markedly did not assert that individuals 
themselves are invested with powers, rights, or privileges by the struc-
tural constitution.208 Nor could he with any plausibility. Rather, the 
touchstone for Justice Kennedy seems to be the intended beneficiaries of 
the Constitution’s drafting, not the textual allocation of interests in the 
document. 
But why should this sort of intended but indirect benefit be sufficient 
for standing purposes? Standing is not a function of the aspirations en-
tertained by a legal text’s drafters. To say that an individual is an intend-
ed indirect beneficiary of a particular regulatory scheme is not at all the 
same as saying that this person is a direct and primary beneficiary of that 
scheme. It is perfectly possible to imagine regulatory schemes, constitu-
tional or otherwise, which empower some individuals or institutions as a 
way of collaterally benefiting others.209 And it has long been federal 
courts’ practice not to grant standing to intended indirect beneficiar-
ies.210 Hence, both the death penalty inmate in Whitmore and the railroad 
denied standing in the Yazoo case were intended beneficiaries without 
being direct beneficiaries of the legal principle they invoked. In neither 
case was the litigant endowed with affirmative powers or rights, even 
though the inevitable and expected effect of the principle’s rigorous en-
forcement might have been to promote their interests.211 Both were thus 
 
205 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
206 Id. (emphasis added). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Consider a common law rule that gives parents certain forms of disciplinary authority 
over their children. It benefits parents directly, but also benefits indirectly friends, family, 
and neighbors who are not exposed to unruly offspring. 
210 See, e.g., Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 156. By contrast, assignees can obtain standing. See 
Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 288–89 (2008).  
211 In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court held that a plaintiff who had previously been 
illegally choked by police lacked standing to secure injunctive relief because he failed to “es-
tablish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped . . . by an officer or offic-
ers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or re-
sistance on this part.” 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). There is at least some tension between 
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closely situated to Ms. Bond. Yet both were denied standing. Drafting 
intentions are, in short, typically insufficient to transform a third-party 
beneficiary into a first-party plaintiff.212 Bond supplies no reason to 
abandon that Article III dictate. 
2. The Weak Structural Constitutionalism-Liberty Linkage 
The second problem with Justice Kennedy’s logic adheres in his 
claim that there is a strong and monotonic relationship between structur-
al constitutional litigation and individual liberty.213 No such strong cor-
relation exists; it cannot be assumed that vindicating a structural consti-
tutional value will also entail vindicating a liberty interest. 
Even a crude comparative empiricism suggests that any simplistic 
equation of attainment of a structural constitutional principle such as 
federalism or the separation of powers and individual liberty is mislead-
ing.214 If structural design decisions do not correlate in a stable, predict-
able way with individual liberty, it is hard to see why judicial enforce-
ment of the structural constitution would inevitably expand such liberty. 
At a very gross level, brute comparison of the United States with coun-
tries that lack either the separation of powers or federalism reveals no 
such relationship. There is no reason to think that merely because a 
country such as Israel or the United Kingdom lacks either kind of formal 
disaggregation of government authority, its nationals lack individual lib-
erty as a day-to-day matter. To be sure, there remains a vigorous and not 
wholly resolved debate in the political science literature as to whether 
presidentialism or parliamentary government is a more effective bulwark 
against dictatorship in the long term.215 Recent studies of constitutional 
 
Lyons’s unwillingness to entertain a probabilistic conception of standing and Bond’s focus 
on the intentions of a legal instrument’s drafters. Surely it is the case that Mr. Lyons was the 
intended beneficiary of the Due Process Clause, and surely an injunction of the kind he 
sought would have provided tangible security to a person who had been subjected to unjusti-
fied chokeholds by police on multiple occasions. Bond lends force to Professor Hessick’s 
insightful and compelling argument that “Article III does not impose a minimum-risk re-
quirement.” F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 55, 58 (2012). 
212 And if they were, the bar to jus tertii is almost a nullity: The intended beneficiaries of a 
law often comprise a very large and amorphous class. 
213 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 (contending that “individual liberty secured by federalism [or 
the separation of powers] is not simply derivative of the rights of the States [or branches]”). 
214 I do not address here any claims of a collective right of self-government; such a right 
has never been judicially vindicated in the United States.  
215 For a skeptical look at the case for distinguishing the two kinds of systems, see José 
Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy 22–23 (2007). 
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adoption and change globally suggest that other nations do not see indi-
vidual liberty as necessarily residing in American ideals of the separa-
tion of powers or federalism.216 The claim that the American ideals of 
structural constitutionalism are uniquely tied to liberty may sell patriot-
ism long and analytic rigor short.217 
Further, it is hardly clear that any judicial promotion of a given struc-
tural principle will always and necessarily increase even the most foun-
dational species of individual liberty. Consider the obvious example of 
race relations and federalism. To call the relationship between federal-
ism and African Americans’ freedom complex and fraught is an under-
statement. On the one hand, it is possible to identify instances in which 
political actors have preserved state regulatory autonomy in ways that 
conduced to individual liberty interests for African Americans.218 But for 
the overwhelming portion of post-Civil War history, claims of “states’ 
rights” were plainly “associated with white supremacy and massive re-
sistance to Brown [v. Board of Education].”219 Claims on behalf of the 
right federal balance were all too often a “stalking horse” for assertions 
of racial hierarchy.220 In the wake of Brown, moreover, the Court’s ac-
ceptance of federalism-inspired concerns about local political control 
imposed a fatal constraint on judicial efforts at school desegregation.221 
Even beyond the school desegregation context, the post-Brown Court 
 
216 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Con-
stitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762, 785–91 (2012) (presenting evidence that “the most distinc-
tive and celebrated structural features of the U.S. Constitution have also fallen out of 
vogue”). Indeed, there is some reason to think that other nations’ parliamentary systems are 
more desirable models for designers of new constitutions. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The 
New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 634 (2000) (opposing “the export of the 
American system [of separation of powers as a model for constitutions of other countries] in 
favor of an approach based on the constitutional practice of . . . many other nations”). 
217 For a recent analysis rejecting institutional design explanations for tyranny and dicta-
torship in favor of demographic ones, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive 
Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 189–92 (2010). 
218 See, e.g., Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slav-
ery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1086, 1119–20 (1993) (discussing Phila-
delphia’s liberty law, used to protect runaway slaves in the 1800s); see also Earl M. Maltz, 
Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 466, 471 
(1992) (noting that the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV, Clause 3, was both proslavery 
and pro-national power). 
219 Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 
Va. L. Rev. 1, 39 n.157 (1996). 
220 Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1304, 1306–07 (1999). 
221 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (barring interdistrict busing 
remedies in school segregation cases out of a concern for “local autonomy”). 
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frequently invoked the federal balance as a reason to refuse judicial vin-
dication of an individual liberty interest.222 At any given moment, the 
example of racial discrimination suggests, the relationship between the 
federal balance and individual freedom is contingent and fragile.223 
Justice Kennedy, of course, was not praising federalism’s contribu-
tions to Jim Crow, and I do not mean to suggest otherwise. In Bond, he 
instead identified a correlation between the federal balance and the reali-
zation of the “diverse needs of a heterogeneous society” and “greater cit-
izen involvement in the democratic processes.”224 Picking up the same 
theme a year later, Chief Justice Roberts in National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius postulated that derogation from “the two-
government system established by the Framers” leads to “a system that 
vests power in one central government, and individual liberty would suf-
fer.”225  
This version of the structural constitutionalism-liberty argument rests 
on two moves. First, in order to trace a thread between federalism and 
liberty, both Kennedy and Roberts appeal to one particular aspect of the 
federal balance—that is, its decentralizing strand. Second, their argu-
ments implicitly disaggregate the general concept of “liberty” and ap-
peal to distinct and different conceptions of liberty. Whereas Kennedy 
appeals to the positive liberty of political participation, Roberts invokes 
a negative liberty lodged against the specter of a potentially tyrannical 
central regulatory state. 
Does this approach suffice to establish a causal link between the judi-
cial promotion of the federal balance and individual liberty robust 
enough to justify Article III standing? It is hard to see how. To begin 
with, the analysis suffers a selection bias problem. That is, Justice Ken-
nedy and Chief Justice Roberts each pick out one of numerous aspects of 
 
222 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377–80 (1976); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 
284, 293 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–46 (1971).  
223 Can the claim that federalism promotes individual liberty from racial discrimination be 
redeemed by claiming that federalism, properly understood, promotes such liberty, but courts 
often err? It is hard to see how. A central axiom of judicially enforced federalism has been 
the preservation of some quantum of state autonomy. Sometimes, this promotes liberty from 
discrimination—and sometimes it does not. 
224 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
225 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012). The connection between federalism and individual liber-
ty reoccurred in both public debates and judicial opinions respecting the individual mandate 
in a fashion “more redolent of Due Process Clause arguments” than Commerce Clause ar-
guments. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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a structural principle (federalism), and then select one of several possi-
ble species of liberty (which comes in positive and negative flavors) in 
order to assert a stable connection between federalism generally and lib-
erty writ large. But such a global conclusion simply cannot be inferred 
from the local observation that one aspect of structural constitutionalism 
applied in the specific context of one policy domain promotes one spe-
cies of liberty. As international comparison has shown, the global claim 
is not obviously true. 
Even Kennedy’s and Roberts’s mooted decentralization-liberty link-
ages rely on contestable empirical and normative foundations. On the 
empirical front, it is quite possible that expanding respect for states’ 
rights, as Ms. Bond sought to do, will on some occasions shift policy au-
thority from actors who are likely to attend to individual liberty to those 
who will not do so. This possibility is most apparent with respect to the 
positive liberties of the economically disadvantaged, who are typically 
better served by the national government.226 By enabling interstate com-
petition and thus increasing the expected flow of citizens from one state 
to another, Ms. Bond effectively sought to undermine state govern-
ments’ capacity to collect taxes and engage in welfare-enhancing redis-
tribution.227 The connection between decentralization and individual lib-
erty (however conceived) thus depends on the particulars of a given 
policy domain, and there is no general reason to think that any one judi-
cial conception of federalism will always or necessarily lead to more 
libertarian outcomes.228 
 
226 See, e.g., Katherine S. Newman & Rourke O’Brien, Taxing the Poor: Doing Damage to 
the Truly Disadvantaged 159–60 (2011) (discussing national welfare policy, and concluding 
that “the basic principle, that all American families are entitled to safety nets of equivalent 
value, should be made real by taking states out of the equation”); Sheryll D. Cashin, Federal-
ism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majori-
ties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 552, 554 (1999) (arguing that “for an identical set of underlying vot-
er preferences with respect to redistribution, a different policy outcome will be reached 
depending on the level of government at which a decision is made”); Craig Volden, The Pol-
itics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 Am. J. Pol. 
Sci. 352, 360 (2002) (finding that competitive pressures prevent states from increasing wel-
fare benefits until surrounding states do the same). 
227 See Paul E. Peterson & Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of American 
Federalism, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 251, 256 (2012). 
228 For exemplary studies of the complex relationship between decentralization and policy 
outcomes in corporation law and environmental law, see Michel Barzuza, Market Segmenta-
tion: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 Va. L. Rev. 935, 935–36 (2012) 
(identifying reasons for concern about the effect of interstate competition over corporate 
regulation); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-
HUQ_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013 6:23 PM 
1488 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:1435 
The same, moreover, holds true of claims about the libertarian effects 
of nationalizing policy control. Consider expansions of national power 
to create a common economic market. This will expand free trade be-
tween the states, thereby increasing one kind of negative liberty. But it is 
likely to have winners and losers. The former will not necessarily com-
pensate the latter. Ex ante, it may be quite reasonable to resist such ex-
pansion, even if you believed it to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, if you think 
that you are likely to be an uncompensated loser. 
A parallel concern applies in the separation of powers domain. It is 
easy to assume that there is some clear link between constraining presi-
dential power and preserving individual liberty.229 But expansions of 
presidential power can either enlarge or contract observed respect for in-
dividual liberties depending upon whether the executive is displacing a 
Congress with either more authoritarian or more libertarian prefer-
ences.230 The effect of separation of powers principles on liberty, there-
fore, depends on the fickle intricacies of partisan political circumstances. 
Hence, it is likely that greater presidential control over the military de-
tentions at the Guantánamo Naval Base was correlated with a higher 
volume of releases than periods of more substantial congressional con-
trol.231 Further, the expansion of presidential control over an administra-
tive agency caused by a decision such as Free Enterprise Fund might 
expand the discretionary freedom of accounting firms, but it may also 
instigate more enforcement actions. Or alternatively, it may compel 
those relying on the latter for services to expend more time and re-
sources on precautions against fraud or misconduct. The net effect on 
 
to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 
1210 (1992) (questioning operation of race-to-the-bottom dynamics in the environmental 
context). 
229 In previous nonacademic writing, I have made the broader claim that fidelity to the 
separation of powers necessarily promotes certain fundamental liberties. See Frederick A.O. 
Schwarz Jr. & Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of 
Terror 8 (2007). That claim, I think, had traction in the specific institutional and historical 
context in which it was made. Separation of powers “talk” certainly seemed to have more 
traction with legal and policy elites at the time than claims about the basic rights of terrorism 
suspects, who tend to be members of disparaged ethnic and religious formations. But I am 
now more cautious in thinking that the claim can be universalized, even if it had utility and 
force in a given historical and political context. 
230 Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 887, 
923 (2012) (developing this point in the context of national security policymaking). 
231 See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 Const. Comment. 385, 401–05 (2010) 
(presenting data to this effect). 
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“individual liberty” is ex ante uncertain. Alternatively, consider whether 
expanding federal authority to seize and shut down too-big-to-fail finan-
cial institutions232 would conduce to expansion or contraction of liberty. 
How recalibration of horizontal, interbranch relations influences indi-
vidual liberties, in short, is contingent on both the momentary dynamics 
of partisan politics and also the background distribution of interest group 
interactions. As with federalism, the simple positive correlation offered 
by the Bond Court obscures more than it illuminates. 
The nexus between liberty-related outcomes and federalism is thus 
fraught. From either a global or a local perspective, there is no stable re-
lation between judicial vindication of structural constitutionalism and 
liberty. Claims to the contrary rely on impermissibly selective examples 
that do not necessarily reflect larger causal trends, and cannot suffice to 
anchor Article III standing. 
My aim in this Part has been to measure the doctrinal justifications for 
individual standing to raise structural constitutional objections against a 
synthetic account of Article III that hinges on avoidance of large exter-
nalities, or spillovers, to unrepresented third parties. Conscious of the 
limits of judicial competence in that regard, the Court has limned a 
common law template for federal litigation and insisted on winnowing 
doctrinal constraints such as strict causation and redressibility rules. In-
dividual standing for the structural constitution is in sharp tension with 
that template for Article III. It persistently produces unmanageable spill-
over effects. The Court’s alternative justification, which relies on posi-
tive libertarian externalities, is not in my view convincing. Individual 
suits on behalf of the structural constitution, it follows, are not well suit-
ed to the institutional capacity constraints of Article III courts. We can-
not without radical institutional surgery alter those constraints. We can, 
however, repudiate a precedential tradition that flies in their face. 
 
232 See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the 
Next Financial Meltdown 80 (2010). The recent Dodd-Frank Act permits cases to be trans-
ferred out of bankruptcy proceedings if their size presents an obstacle. 12 U.S.C. § 5383 
(2012). See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 208, 124 Stat. 1376, 1459–60 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5388 (2012)) (au-
thorizing removal of case from bankruptcy to Dodd-Frank resolution); U.S. Dep’t of Treas-
ury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 76–79 (2009), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“Bankruptcy is and will re-
main the dominant tool for handling the failure of a [bank holding company], unless the spe-
cial resolution regime is triggered because of concerns about financial stability.”). 
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IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STANDING FOR THE STRUCTURAL 
CONSTITUTION 
This Part turns from an internal to an external perspective. It switches 
from doctrine to political economy. Individual and institutional plain-
tiffs, I will suggest, are motivated by distinctively different incentives 
and institutional contexts. To gauge the effect of such differences upon 
structural constitutional litigation, I develop here an extended compari-
son between individual and institutional representatives of the structural 
constitution. The resulting analysis suggests that, whereas separation of 
powers and federalism values are adequately (albeit not perfectly) pro-
moted by institutional plaintiffs, the marginal addition of individual 
plaintiffs risks imperiling constitutional goods. Somewhat counterintui-
tively, I conclude that more litigation may well not always be better. 
The analysis has two strands. First, I examine individual opportunities 
and incentives to trigger structural constitutional litigation. The distribu-
tion of those opportunities, I suggest, does not conduce to optimal en-
forcement of the structural constitution. Drawing inter alia on public 
choice insights, I posit that interest groups will tend to deploy judicial 
review to obtain private goods they cannot secure in the political process 
in ways that do not necessarily conduce to constitutional goals.233 Sec-
ond, I consider institutional incentives to defend the structural constitu-
tion. This analysis draws on the “new-separation-of-powers approach,” 
which posits that “we cannot fully understand the behavior of one insti-
tution without understanding it in the context of the othe[r institutions 
with which it coexists].”234 No less than legislatures and agencies—the 
typical focus of the new separation of powers approach—federal courts 
are embedded in sequential interactions with other government institu-
 
233 See Maxwell L. Stearns & Todd J. Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts and Applications 
in Law 471–73 (2009) (describing potential theories of interest group influence on the 
courts); see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judi-
cial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 66–68 (1991) (noting consequences of interest group influ-
ence on the courts). For an example of how outcomes can be achieved through litigation 
when legislation is not an option, see, e.g., Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials 
Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85, 97 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 483, 483 (2003) (exploring how advocates secured desegregation of un-
ions through the courts despite the absence of political branch support). 
234 Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., et al., The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to Ameri-
can Politics, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 200 (Barry R. Weingast & Don-
ald Wittman, eds., 2006) (quotation marks omitted). 
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tions animated by distinctive strategic goals.235 This dynamic and con-
textual perspective yields a relatively optimistic view of institutional 
plaintiffs in contrast to the bleak prospects for individual litigants. To 
the extent courts properly consider structural constitutional questions at 
all, it makes sense to close the door to all but institutional litigants. 
At the threshold, I should stress that my argument here is comparative 
in nature. I do not make the (implausible) claim that institutions have 
perfectly tailored incentives. Rather, I argue more modestly that compar-
ison of individual and institutional incentives suggests that more desira-
ble results will fall out from a circumscription of standing to institutions 
alone in structural constitutional litigation. 
A. The Political Economy of Individual Standing for the Structural 
Constitution 
On first inspection, permitting individual standing for the structural 
constitution seems obviously sound. Enlarging the pool of plaintiffs, one 
might think, means that federal judges will have, ceteris paribus, more 
frequent occasion to evaluate laws and practices that might trench on the 
structural constitution. More adjudicative opportunities mean that judges 
are more likely to alight upon the correct constitutional rule. More accu-
rate adjudication and greater fidelity to the structural constitution ensue. 
More litigation, in short, is better for the Constitution. 
My aim in this Section is to challenge that intuition from two direc-
tions. Both arguments focus on unanticipated side effects of a deeper lit-
igant pool that undermine the accuracy-promoting effect. First, allowing 
individuals as well as institutions to vindicate the structural constitution 
does not simply enlarge the litigant pool but also changes its composi-
tion. At least pursuant to current justiciability doctrine, inflation in the 
array of potential plaintiffs will be uneven, with unequal numbers of 
plaintiffs arrayed behind otherwise complementary and offsetting provi-
sions of the structural constitution. Under plausible assumptions—
developed at length below—this imbalance will engender skewed en-
forcement of structural constitutional rules. Rather than promoting de-
sirable interbranch equilibria or an optimal “federal balance,”236 judicial 
results will accordingly diverge from structural constitutional aspira-
tions. Second, an analysis using public choice tools shows that the inter-
 
235 Id. at 207–08. 
236 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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play of interest groups likely yields results out of step with constitution-
ally desirable goals. Together, these arguments seek to undermine the 
intuition that opening the courthouse door wider to private litigants con-
duces to greater fidelity to the Constitution. 
1. The Divergent Goals of Rights and Structural Litigation 
The intuition that increasing the number of plaintiffs leads to better 
constitutional compliance is plausibly motivated by analogies from the 
individual rights context. Accordingly, I begin the analysis by working 
up an example from the individual rights context to identify the mecha-
nisms underpinning the intuition. I then develop reasons why those 
mechanisms will not translate into the structural constitutional context. 
Consider a (slightly) counterfactual world in which a constitutional 
value—say, the Establishment Clause—can only be enforced by litigants 
who cannot choose to opt out of the challenged government institu-
tion.237 School children can challenge graduation prayers. But citizens 
cannot challenge religious displays in public buildings or public cere-
monies, or lodge Establishment Clause challenges against state tax rules. 
In these conditions, judges receive only weak signals of the frequency of 
impermissible establishments. They are ill-informed about the causes 
and consequences of such violations. Litigation yields incomplete op-
portunities to formulate prophylactic rules. A patchwork of protections 
ensues, as judges have scant opportunities to develop precisely tailored 
rules that prevent circumvention or to devise effective make-whole rem-
edies. 
By contrast, imagine another counterfactual world with more gener-
ous Establishment Clause standing. Here, plaintiffs could challenge the 
plenary range of establishments in schools, government buildings, offi-
cial practices, and even coinage. Judges not only have more opportuni-
ties to reach the right rule. They also have more information about viola-
tions and about the state’s attempted camouflaging of violations. They 
have more opportunities to fine-tune rules to prevent circumvention, and 
more chances to fashion effective remedies. Cause lawyers can find 
more sympathetic plaintiffs and respond to new precedent by strategical-
ly selecting new cases and raising new issues. Broader standing also 
means the shadow of judicial intervention is more likely to have a gen-
 
237 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992) (holding that clergy-delivered 
prayers at public school graduations violate the Establishment Clause). 
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eral deterrence as well as a specific deterrence effect. “The availability 
of private suits [will] increase the likelihood that enforcement actions 
will occur and, as a result, [will] cause more potential defendants to re-
frain from conduct in which they would otherwise engage.”238 In short, 
more ample vindication of the Establishment Clause follows not solely 
because judges have more bites at the apple but also because of epistem-
ic gains, litigation-related learning about both rights and remedies, and 
general deterrence effects.239 
The mechanisms that yield improved constitutional compliance in the 
rights context do not, though, translate unmodified to the structural con-
stitutional context. Rather, those same mechanisms—especially when 
they interact with Article III standing doctrine—are likely to yield pied 
patterns of litigation that poorly serve structural ambitions. In the rights 
context, an increasing volume of litigation better vindicates a constitu-
tional norm regardless of the precise distribution of plaintiffs. If the fed-
eral courts vigorously enforce the Establishment Clause in schools but 
not prisons, its uneven approach is not intrinsically in tension with con-
stitutional goods. It just means that some enjoy the right while others do 
not. There are, to be sure, a class of cases in which increasing enforce-
ment of one entitlement (for example, the Establishment Clause) might 
trench on another (for example, the Free Exercise Clause). But these 
cases are few and far between, and the Court has developed strategies to 
account for them.240 
In the structural constitutionalism context, by contrast, it is not suffi-
cient to increase the pool of litigants to vindicate the Constitution more 
 
238 See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and 
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 Va. L. Rev. 633, 667 (2006). Hence, in the 
1960s and 1970s, environmental and consumer groups “made an end run [around Congress] 
to the courts, where they have skillfully exploited and magnified limited legislative gains.” 
Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts, 70 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 723, 724 (1976). 
239 I do not mean to ignore the possibility that litigants will pick flawed strategies, going 
for broke when they should proceed incrementally—as may currently be the case with litiga-
tion respecting same-sex marriage. See Scott Baker & Gary Biglaiser, A Model of Cause 
Lawyering (Oct. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
240 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004) (discussing competing de-
mands of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause). But cf. Ricci v. DeStefa-
no, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (reading the disparate impact standard of Title VII narrow-
ly to avoid conflict with the colorblindness norm of the Equal Protection Clause). If rights-
rights conflicts were sufficiently pervasive, the case for “more is better” in the rights litiga-
tion context would also be properly cast into doubt. 
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effectively. Unlike rights, federalism and the separation of powers im-
plicate complex institutional balancings. Plural constitutional values are 
arrayed in tension with each other. Each value is vested in a different 
constitutional entity. In both the interbranch and the intergovernmental 
contexts, judges insist on the metaphor of “balance”241 between such in-
stitutions to capture the constitutional desideratum. This sort of institu-
tional equilibrium is distinct from the ad hoc and localized “balancing” 
of policy values that characterizes rights adjudication.242 In lieu of the 
granular, local calibrations of individual and social interests observed in 
rights adjudication, balancing in the structural constitutional context en-
tails a molar effort to stabilize a durable relationship between plural 
right-bearing entities so as to ensure that their ongoing interactions yield 
socially desirable outcomes.243 This striving toward a stable equilibrium 
will be fruitless if the judiciary constantly prioritizes one entity over 
others by dint of standing rules. If courts protect one branch but not oth-
ers, or the federal government over the states, there is a risk that judicial 
action will careen toward an undesirable disequilibrium. Simply put, the 
uneven enforcement of structural constitutional values, unlike uneven 
enforcement of constitutional rights, can undermine constitutional goals. 
In a counterfactual world in which only branches and states have 
standing for the structural constitution, the risk of such asymmetrical 
outcomes is low. This is so not least for the simple reason that the num-
ber of plaintiffs is relatively small. Moreover, as I develop in Section 
IV.B, there is some reason to expect institutional actors to behave with 
restraint when it comes to litigation. 
The same does not hold for individual litigants. For individual stand-
ing to produce desirable results, the expected stream of individual liti-
 
241 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3156 (2010) (separation of powers); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (fed-
eralism). 
242 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 
943, 945 (1987) (describing balancing as an analysis that “identif[ies] interests implicated by 
the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or im-
plicitly assigning values to the identified interests”). For an alternative (and insightful) for-
mulation of what is at stake in rights-related balancing, see Frederick Schauer, A Comment 
on the Structure of Rights, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 415, 430 (1993) (“[T]he [constitutional] right . . . 
just is the right to demand [a] higher level of justification, and the right is satisfied when that 
higher level of justification is respected.”). 
243 I assume for the purposes of this Article that there is a connection between intergov-
ernmental or interbranch balance and socially desirable outcomes. But see sources collected 
in supra note 13 (doubting that claim). 
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gants for the structural constitution would have to be distributed in such 
a way as to generate desirable interbranch or intergovernmental balanc-
es. To frame the argument most starkly, consider a (hypothetical) world 
in which individual plaintiffs defended only violations of Article I but 
not violations of Article II. This would likely generate lopsided out-
comes out of kilter with the interbranch balance. As an initial matter, the 
greater number of opportunities on one side of the interbranch balance 
would entail that federal judges would be better informed about Con-
gress’s side of the separation of powers. As well as being aware of one 
species of constitutional infringement, judges would also have more 
chances to intervene to protect Congress. Over time, substantive rules 
would become more precisely tailored to preclude circumvention by the 
executive, remedies better suited to make the legislature whole. Plain-
tiffs wielding Article I as a sword would also devise new litigation strat-
egies to leverage emerging precedent. Moreover, assuming a non-zero 
rate of false positives, judges may enforce Article I in some instances 
where there is no cause to do so. For all these reasons, skewed distribu-
tions of litigants will not yield greater fidelity to the separation of pow-
ers writ large because judges will be asymmetrically updated by litigants 
about the underlying state of the world, because an imbalanced set of lit-
igation opportunities will conduce to imbalanced enforcement patterns, 
and because false positives are inevitable. 
The same disequilibriating dynamic will emerge under conditions in 
which there is any substantially asymmetric distribution of plaintiffs 
across different sides of the interbranch or intergovernmental balance. 
Poorly proportioned litigant pools will increase the frequency of litiga-
tion opportunities to vindicate one aspect of the structural constitution 
via asymmetrical distributions of judgments, epistemic and learning ef-
fects on judges, litigants’ strategic behavior, and judicial error. The re-
sult is increased enforcement of one structural value, not the separation 
of powers more generally. Avoiding that undesirable outcome in separa-
tion of powers cases would demand a population of claimants distributed 
so as to avoid lopsided imbalances in favor of one branch or another. In 
the federalism context, the claimant pool should have the correct propor-
tions of litigants pressing states’ rights and trumpeting the national gov-
ernment’s interests. 
The challenge of building an adequate litigant pool is further compli-
cated by the possibility of nondoctrinal distortions to the interbranch or 
intergovernmental balance. Such distortions would require offsetting ad-
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justments to the composition of the plaintiff population. Federal judges, 
for example, may tend to err unevenly. In separation of powers cases, it 
might be hypothesized, presidential selection of judges will typically 
generate a pro-executive bench. And in federalism cases, the national 
nature of the appointment process might yield a corresponding tilt. Fur-
ther, courts operate against whatever exogenously determined backdrop 
of interbranch or intergovernmental relations emerges from contingent, 
path-dependent patterns of historical development. Mottled spurts of in-
stitutional expansion over the past two centuries may have already 
thrown institutional equilibria out of joint.244 To honor the structural 
constitution, that is, federal judges must not only cultivate balanced 
pools of claimants, they must also account for exogenous mutations to 
the constitutional baseline and recalibrate accordingly. 
But there is no reason to believe we possess the good fortune of hav-
ing such precisely composed litigant pools in the structural constitution-
al context. There is no providential invisible hand assuring the correct 
distribution and number of litigants of each side of the federalism bal-
ance or separation of powers. As Professor Adrian Vermeule has ex-
plained in these pages recently, an invisible hand argument is one in 
which “some good arises as an unintended byproduct of decentralized 
action”245 through the operation of a clearly specified causal mechanism. 
Its standard form resides in “the operation of the price system in perfect-
ly competitive markets [that is claimed to] produce long-run allocative 
and productive efficiency in which net social benefits are maximized.”246 
It is simply unclear what the causal mechanism is that would produce 
optimally balanced pools of litigants in the structural constitutional con-
text. Private litigants’ incentives—discussed at length below247—do not 
 
244 For contrasting assessments of twentieth-century institutional developments at the na-
tional level, compare Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale 
L.J. 453, 459 (1989) (generally approbatory), with Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 
1937, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 5, 5 (1988) (generally critical).  
245 Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 Va. L. Rev. 
1417, 1422 (2010); cf. Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 70 (2011) [herein-
after, Vermeule, System of the Constitution] (suggesting that invisible hand mechanisms rest 
on (1) an explanation, (2) a value theory, and (3) a mechanism).  
246 Vermeule, System of the Constitution, supra note 245, at 73. Whether the price mecha-
nism satisfies these conditions is a much controverted question outside my ambit here. 
247 See infra Subsection IV.A.2. 
HUQ_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013 6:23 PM 
2013] Standing for the Structural Constitution 1497 
obviously net out so as to produce optimal distributions of litigation.248 
The fact that some institutions are likely to have vigorous defenders is 
not a virtue here, but an accomplice to error, helping to enlarge the dis-
tance from the constitutional optimum.249 And judges are unlikely to 
have the necessary epistemic resources and long-range planning capacity 
to estimate how a given standing rule will translate into structural consti-
tutional outcomes. And in any event, Article III doctrine is framed in 
transubstantive terms that apply equally to all kinds of litigation. Its 
bundled character makes tailoring for structural constitutional law’s ends 
all the more infeasible, absent some categorical exclusion of such cases 
of the kind advanced here. 
Hopes for a beneficent invisible hand operating through the courts be-
come even more remote when we account for how judges have limned 
current standing doctrine. Elements of the latter make it close to inevita-
ble that some structural constitutional values will be enforced more ag-
gressively than others without regard to underlying need. Instead, com-
plementary institutional design safeguards are treated in radically 
different ways for justiciability purposes. Given these categorical blind 
spots in judicial enforcement of the structural constitution, an inflation-
ary account of justiciability rules is all the more prone to producing 
skew-whiff outcomes. 
Four elements of standing doctrine are especially problematic here. 
First, consider the interaction between the rule against generalized 
grievances and Article I’s structural regulation. The Framers included 
provisions in Article I to prevent the executive from “seducing con-
gressmen with government sinecures” or bribing them with “double sal-
aries or make-work jobs.”250 The Court, however, has treated these “anti-
 
248 Cf. Vermeule, System of the Constitution, supra note 245, at 75 (criticizing arguments 
when there is “no mechanism to explain why the relevant groups would move toward the 
efficient regime”). 
249 Could this therefore be a “special case of the general theory of second best”? Id. at 87; 
see R.G. Lipsey & K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 
11, 11 (1956) (identifying the possibility that when exogenous, fixed constraints prevent the 
attainment of any one first-best condition, “the other Paretian conditions, although still at-
tainable, are, in general, no longer desirable”); see also Huq, supra note 230, at 904–05 (de-
scribing theory). I am not sanguine about the predictive capacities of the Lipsey-Lancaster 
theorem, which does not specify the conditions under which more piecemeal adjustments 
from the optimal are better than fewer such adjustments. Nevertheless, it is the case here that 
partial availability of litigation opportunities may produce less desirable outcomes than no 
litigation opportunities. 
250 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 63, 78, 182 (2005). 
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entanglement” rules as nonjusticiable. In consequence, violations of the 
Emoluments Clause’s rule against interbranch appointments251 generate 
no actionable injury,252 and violations of the same Clause’s rule against 
salary increases for certain new appointees also creates no individual Ar-
ticle III plaintiffs.253 In each line of cases, the bar to generalized griev-
ances curtails enforcement of elements in the structural constitution de-
signed to prevent excessive interbranch overlap.254 As a result, the 
institutional design principle of restricting impermissible interbranch en-
tanglements will be systematically underenforced because of a con-
sistent undersupply of eligible plaintiffs.255 At the same time, other ele-
ments of the Constitution that have a checking effect through mandatory 
interbranch entanglements—for example, bicameralism and the veto as 
the lawmaking process—operate with judicial enforcement. The net re-
sult is quantitative unevenness in judicial vindication of the structural 
constitution as interbranch checks are enforced, but limits on interbranch 
entanglements are not. 
Second, skewed enforcement also arises in respect to rules allocating 
lawmaking power between the branches. With the exception of two 
seemingly “aberration[al]” outliers in the 1930s, the Court has declined 
to enforce any strong constraint on the quantum of delegation from 
Congress to the executive branch.256 At the same time, the Court has also 
 
251 U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
252 See Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633–34 (1937) (rejecting Emoluments Clause chal-
lenge to Justice Black’s appointment); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the 
War, 418 U.S. 208, 215–16 (1974) (denying standing in a challenge to the eligibility of 
members of Congress to hold commissions in the Armed Forces Reserves during their con-
tinuance in office). 
253 Congress routinely works around the Emoluments Clause through the Saxbe fix, 
“through which Congress removes [a representative’s] ineligibility by reducing an office’s 
salary.” Note, The Ineligibility Clause’s Lost History: Presidential Patronage and Congress, 
1787–1850, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1727, 1727 (2010). 
254 Furthermore, lower courts have held that Congress is precluded from granting standing 
to challenge unconstitutional interbranch entanglements because of the absence of Article III 
standing. See Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128–29 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding 
that the Secretary of State Emoluments Act, S.J. Res. 46, Pub. L. No. 110-455, 
§ 1(b)(1)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 5036 (2008), creating individual standing to challenge Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton’s appointment, did not overcome Article III standing hurdles), appeal 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 130 S. Ct. 3384, 3384 (2010). 
255 It is hard to see how the Court could “compensate” for this gap by over-enforcing in 
justiciable cases. 
256 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1722 (2002). Some conservative jurists have called recently for reinvig-
oration of the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 
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continued to allow plaintiffs to challenge legislative efforts to regulate 
delegations post hoc.257 As a result of these rules, the Court evinces large 
deference to political branches’ institutional choices along one margin, 
but then, along another diametrically opposed margin, “prevents . . . 
compensating adjustment from being made by any institution, short of 
obtaining a constitutional amendment.”258 
Third, consider the asymmetric judicial treatment of complementary 
federalism safeguards. The Court has thus treated numerous national 
governmental obligations toward the state as nullities on justiciability 
grounds. Individuals seeking to invoke states’ interests created by the 
Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4, for instance, have been turned 
away at the courthouse door.259 Similarly, efforts to invoke the federal 
obligation to maintain states’ “republican form of government” have 
been blocked on political question grounds.260 So even as the Court has 
assiduously cultivated one aspect of the federalism dynamic, it has left 
ungardened the positive duties owed by the national government to the 
states. In the end, these asymmetries mean the federal courts will slight 
some aspects of the interbranch or intergovernmental balance, even as 
other aspects secure plenary vindication. Perhaps this can be justified by 
positing some deformity in the extant federal-state balance, but the 
Court has not rested its standing rulings on this controversial ground. 
Fourth, contemporary formulations of the injury-of-fact, causation, 
and redressibility rules tend to generate discordant outcomes out of indi-
 
525 F.3d 23, 34–40 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (castigating majority for thin 
nondelegation analysis and arguing that no standard was provided to guide the delegate in 
acquiring land in trust for “whichever Indians he chooses, for whatever reasons”). Note that I 
am not denying that courts can effectuate antidelegation values via statutory interpretation. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 315–16 (2000). But, 
as I elaborate in Part IV, that practice rests on acoustically separate foundations not implicat-
ed by my main argument. 
257 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983). For a development of the imbalance 
point, see Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative 
State; Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 37–38 
(1994). 
258 Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, 
436 (2003) (arguing that judges might engage in “systematic deference [or] systematic seria-
tim enforcement of local constitutional provisions,” but that “judges should [not] evaluate 
global consequences on a case-by-case basis”). My point here is that judges should not take 
different strategies to related design questions. 
259 See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (denying individual standing to bring 
claims under U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). 
260 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 20–21, 39–42 (1849). 
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vidual standing for the structural constitution. The legislative veto inval-
idated in 1983 in INS v. Chadha261 is a useful threshold example here. 
Congress had been using simple resolutions to direct cabinet secretaries 
to engage in investigations and issue reports since at least 1903.262 A 
first legislative veto was enacted in 1932—more than fifty years before 
the Chadha opinion.263 It is surely worth inquiring as to why there was 
an absence of constitutional challenges to the legislative veto for about 
half a century.264 One possible explanation is that Congress did not need 
to use the legislative veto frequently in order to influence executive 
branch behavior—the mere shadow of congressional responses was suf-
ficient to induce desired agency policies.265 If legislative vetoes were 
largely anticipated by agencies unwilling to antagonize their congres-
sional paymasters, we would expect to see less agency slack and fewer 
instances in which Congress in fact deployed the veto. Anticipated re-
sponsiveness on the executive’s part, however, would drain the pool of 
individuals who could satisfy the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressi-
bility requirements of Article III standing.266 At the same time, Congress 
would still obtain roughly the results it would have obtained via active 
use of the veto. 
The injury-in-fact rule further means that structural constitutional vio-
lations may generate no litigants with Article III standing for those vio-
lations that generate solely immediate “winners.” For instance, the 
White House might accept an unconstitutional restriction upon its ap-
pointment or directive authority because it is in the short-term political 
interest of an Oval Office incumbent. Or states might accept an imper-
 
261 462 U.S. at 930−31. 
262 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 14, 1903, Pub. L. No. 87, § 8, 32 Stat. 825, 829 (1903); see also 
Act of Mar. 3, 1905, Pub. L. No. 215, § 2, 33 Stat. 1117, 1147 (1905) (directing investiga-
tion via concurrent resolution). 
263 See Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 212, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414 (1932). 
264 One reason is not relevant here: Congress’s use of legislative vetoes tended to fall off in 
the absence of political conflict between the branches. The 1940s and the 1970s were thus 
periods of increased employment of legislative vetoes. See David A. Martin, The Legislative 
Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253, 258–59 
(1982). Of course, in the 1950s and 1960s, the earlier statutes with legislative vetoes re-
mained on the books and in use.  
265 And when Congress did use it, standing bars sometimes precluded adjudication. See 
McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1261–62 (4th Cir. 1977) (denying challenge to 
legislative veto provision in the Salary Act on standing grounds).  
266 This account finds vindication in the persistent post-Chadha use of the legislative veto 
as a signaling device between Congress and the federal administrative state. See supra text 
accompanying note 190.  
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missible intrusion on their regulatory jurisdiction to gain cost savings. 
The Constitution may be violated in both cases, but all those directly af-
fected are beneficiaries of the violation. And beneficiaries cannot sue. 
This problem is somewhat parallel to the concern with “givings” identi-
fied by property scholars as the hidden corollary of the takings problem. 
Roughly speaking, a “givings” arises when “the value of . . . property 
increases as a result of the government action” even if the government 
does not act directly on the property.267 Like takings, givings implicate 
fairness, efficiency, and anti-rent-seeking concerns.268 Yet givings are 
largely off the judicial radar. The result is a skewed jurisprudence that 
often gives a free pass to rent-seeking and other foibles supposedly par-
ried by the Taking Clause.269 The same concerns, mutatis mutandi, arise 
in the structural constitutional context, when constitutional violations 
produce an immediate social welfare surplus that can be used to buy off 
all relevant parties. 
Even when a constitutional violation has more deleterious conse-
quences, affected parties may still not have an adequate injury in fact. In 
some instances, a violation of the separation of powers results in only an 
epistemic loss for the public. Absent a statutory basis for suit, however, 
no individual plaintiff has standing. Thus, in United States v. Richard-
son,270 the Court held that a member of the public could not challenge 
violations of the Accounts Clause of Article I, Section 9,271 based on the 
federal government’s failure to publish a budget for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. 
In sum, current standing and justiciability doctrines are not well tem-
pered for generating optimal litigant flows to vindicate the structural 
constitution. Rather than operating as a benevolent invisible hand, con-
stitutional doctrine invites a motley and incongruous pool of litigants. 
Given that pool, some elements of the intergovernmental or interbranch 
 
267 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 551 
(2001). 
268 Id. at 577–89. Moreover, as Professors Bell and Parchomovsky compellingly argue, 
givings and takings are functionally entangled. Id. at 552. 
269 Id. at 615–16 (proposing changes to policy and doctrine). 
270 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (rejecting Richardson’s complaint as a “generalized 
grievance”). The Court also distinguished cases in which the plaintiff had a basis for stand-
ing. Id. at 176 n.9; see also McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1236–39 (3d Cir. 
1993) (finding no standing to seek informational production from the government absent the 
filing of a Freedom of Information Act request as defined by statute). 
271 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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balance will inevitably be emphasized to the detriment of others. Absent 
any convincing account of how this haphazard approach to structural 
constitutional litigation can result in desirable institutional outcomes ei-
ther in the short- or long-term, skepticism about individual standing in 
this domain seems all the more appropriate. 
2. Public Choice and Structural Constitutional Litigation 
To redeem institutional standing for the structural constitution, we 
might lean in another way on the idea that individual litigants will tend 
to sue in lock-step with constitutional need, yielding a docket well suited 
for vindicating structural values. To that end, this Subsection focuses on 
individual litigants’ likely incentives. Incentives matter because litiga-
tion is costly. Not all potential litigants will therefore file suit. To under-
stand the consequences of granting individuals standing to litigate the 
structural constitution, it is therefore useful to model the reasons indi-
viduals have recourse to the courts. 
Public choice theory furnishes a basis for such predictions. Exploited 
by legal scholars first in the 1980s, public choice involves application of 
economic models to political institutions.272 Scholars identified the rela-
tive cost of collective action for interest groups of varying size as a basis 
for predictions about the kind of legislative consequences (if any) the 
clash of interest groups would generate.273 Drawing on Mancur Olson’s 
pioneering work, which emphasized the high transaction costs encum-
bering large organizations,274 this first generation of public choice schol-
ars predicted that smaller, more concentrated groups would be the more 
effective lobbyists.275 To be sure, public choice’s elegant predictions 
have been complicated and qualified by evidence that different policies 
generate different patterns of enactment costs,276 and that interest group 
 
272 For an introduction to the field see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Pub-
lic Choice (1991). 
273 Stearns & Zywicki, supra note 233, at 69–72 (outlining the simple model offered by 
Professors James Wilson and Michael Hayes).  
274 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups 2 (1965) (identifying a negative correlation between group size and efficacy); see 
also Stearns & Zywicki, supra note 233, at 55–56 (drawing on Olson’s work). 
275 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 
211, 213 (1976). 
276 Voter distaste for a policy can drive up the “price” of that policy. See Arthur T. Denzau 
& Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get 
Represented, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89, 99 (1986). Group size may also be uncorrelated to 
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coalitions tend to be complex and not easily reducible to a “small group” 
or “large group.”277 But the theory’s core insight—that public policy is 
the product of competition between private interest groups for legislative 
influence—remains illuminating. 
Public choice insights apply equally to the judicial domain. Courts, no 
less than legislatures, are arenas for interest group mobilization. There-
fore, public choice tools can be used to predict which private actors will 
invest in litigation to secure policy change via the courts.278 To be sure, 
interest groups do not influence federal judges in the same way that they 
obtain leverage over legislators. Federal judges do not stand for reelec-
tion.279 They also operate under tight “institutional constraints,” cabining 
their capacity to respond to interest group entreaties.280 Interest groups 
may nonetheless seek to influence appointments on the theory that judi-
cial ideology predicts voting behavior after appointment.281 And even 
 
interest groups’ ability to supply information, which is argued to be the principal currency of 
lobbying. See Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy, 100 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 69 (2006). 
277 Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and 
Why 26 (2009) (noting “a surprising tendency for sides to be heterogeneous”). 
278 William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 953, 967 (1998) (“While the judiciary is more independent of the ordinary 
political processes than the legislature or the executive branches, this independence does not 
place judges above the fray of interest-group politics . . . .”). For formal models, see John M. 
de Figueiredo & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: 
Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation, 4 Bus. & Pol. 161, 163 (2002) (model-
ing how “competing interest groups with differential resources configure their nonmarket 
spending over lobbying and litigation to maximize the possibility of a favourable policy out-
come”); see also Paul H. Rubin, Christopher Curran & John F. Curran, Litigation Versus 
Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers, 107 Pub. Choice 295, 297–302 (2001) (mod-
eling interest group choice to use litigation rather than lobbying in respect to private law 
rules). 
279 But see Elhauge, supra note 233, at 82–83 (doubting the efficacy of ex post electoral 
controls).  
280 Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public 
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 827, 827 (1990). Professor Elhauge has persuasively ar-
gued that many constraints on interest group influence on the judiciary are inefficacious. El-
hauge, supra note 233, at 81–83. 
281 David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1033, 1033, 1056 (2008) (reviewing Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: Preserving 
Independent Courts in Angry Times (2006) & Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: 
The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control of the United States Supreme Court (2007)) 
(noting “the proliferation of interest groups” involved in the judicial confirmation process); 
see also Elhauge, supra note 233, at 81–82 (discussing, in more nuanced terms, the mixed 
evidence on this score). Interest groups are not unwise to see judicial selection as pivotal to 
outcomes. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
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after a judge is confirmed, interest groups can influence the sequence 
and type of cases lodged before tribunals as a way of molding the path 
of the law. After all, without a litigant well resourced and motivated 
enough to challenge a law, no court will likely discover a given constitu-
tional flaw. 
Standing doctrine plays a gatekeeping function in this political econ-
omy of interest group competition. All else being equal, a more permis-
sive version of standing, vesting individuals, as well as institutions, with 
courthouse access, will generate a greater volume of strategic litigation. 
Narrowing the courthouse door by limiting the class of constitutionally 
permissible plaintiffs chokes off interest group incentives to invoke ju-
dicial review, and so slows the rate of judicially driven policy change. 
Once the courthouse door is open, however, the play of incentives and 
interests will determine the net effect of litigation. Given permissible 
standing rules, public choice theory predicts that it will most likely be 
interest groups with relatively large incentives and small collective ac-
tion costs who will invoke federal court jurisdiction in the name of the 
structural constitution.282 All other things being equal, the standard pub-
lic choice account suggests that it will be “regulated industries [that are 
sufficiently] well financed and well organized, especially when com-
pared to the general public and public interest groups” that file suit.283 
Such:  
“[s]mall intensely interested groups are . . . likely to spend more on 
their litigation efforts than any large diffuse groups opposing them . . . 
[and] will on balance be able to hire more skilled lawyers and thus 
have more influence on the information presented to the court about 
 
Model 316–26 (1993) (describing evidence of the influence of Justices’ political attitudes on 
their voting patterns); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: 
A Statistical Study, 1 J. Legal Analysis 775 (2009) (identifying a link between appointing 
coalition’s ideology and judicial votes). 
282 Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side 
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1551, 1579 (2003) (describing the manner in which a system of 
precedent creates an “incentive to engage in rent-seeking litigation” on the part of interest 
groups); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and So-
cial Choice, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1309, 1329–51 (1995) (developing a similar concern about 
interest group manipulation and suggesting that standing doctrine provides a way of limiting 
such manipulation).  
283 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional De-
sign, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 22 (2010). For a recent and powerful empirical demonstration of 
this point, see Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political 
Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy 19–20, 263–443 (2012).  
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the social desirability of the parties’ conduct and any legal rule under 
consideration.”284 
By comparison, widely diffused and weakly organized sections of the 
public sharing an interest in vindicating a certain vision of the Constitu-
tion will often not be able to muster the resources to support costly, 
time-consuming, and uncertain federal court litigation.285 Even ideologi-
cal litigants, that is, need to find a sponsor with adequate funds to sup-
port their case. With the important exception of criminal cases such as 
Bond and Lopez, ideologically inspired individual litigants will often 
lack the incentives and resources to pursue a lonely, seemingly quixotic, 
crusade through the federal judicial hierarchy.286 
This play of interest groups will interact with an important aspect of 
justiciability doctrine that until this point has played no role in the argu-
ment: Plaintiffs can challenge government action but cannot typically 
challenge government inaction.287 Certainly, there is no case that I am 
aware of in which a federal court has awarded relief simply because of 
Congress’s failure to enact a law. This means that judicial review avails 
the losers in the legislative process when a bill does become law, but not 
when a bill is defeated.288 Public choice dynamics intersect with standing 
doctrine’s asymmetric treatment of challenges to government action and 
inaction. Regulated industries and entities, all else being equal, often 
tend to seek a lighter rather than a heavier governmental hand (except, to 
be sure, in instances where regulation preserves a monopoly against new 
entrants). They therefore can use structural constitutional litigation to 
challenge successfully enacted regulation. Representatives of more dif-
fuse groups, such as consumers and other advocates of greater regula-
tion, will often tend to seek regulation. If they lose in the legislative pro-
 
284 Elhauge, supra note 233, at 77. 
285 Cf. id. at 67 (“Large diffuse groups unable to organize effective efforts to influence the 
political branches, where they at least have the advantage of more votes, are also likely to be 
unable to organize effective efforts to influence the litigation process.”). 
286 The public record does not reveal what prompted Carol Bond’s lawyers to raise the 
constitutional issue before the district court, and then to plead before trial, reserving the right 
to raise the issue on appeal. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132–33 (3d Cir. 2009). 
287 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). 
288 To be sure, the winners in the legislative process might seek to install their victory in 
the form of an agency rather than a policy directive. See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral 
Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321, 331 
(2002) (observing that groups that are electorally weak are more likely to insulate their pre-
ferred policies by designing independent agencies). But then, the organic statute of the agen-
cy can be challenged. 
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cess, there is frequently no substitute in the courts. As a result, the con-
sequent flow of litigation is not evenly distributed across structural con-
stitutional values. Further, there is little reason to expect that federal 
judges, no matter how familiar with the possibility of “unseen” collateral 
effects, will be able to compensate for asymmetrical case selection ef-
fects.289 
A deregulatory slant can be observed in recent developments in the 
scope of both the Commerce Clause290 and the emerging corpus of re-
moval-power jurisprudence.291 In both domains, major challenges to 
federal laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the federal healthcare 
law, have pursued an anti-regulation agenda that interest groups had 
previously pressed, unsuccessfully, in Congress.292 By contrast, it is dif-
ficult to think of any instance in which a consumer group or other advo-
cate of greater regulation has been able to leverage the structural consti-
tution in its favor. These examples suggest that it is indeed precisely in 
those rare instances in which a legislative coalition is assembled out of 
the diffuse public and is able to overcome a well-organized, well-heeled 
interest group,293 that structural constitutional litigation in federal court 
is likely to be harnessed as yet another veto-gate to delay or defenestrate 
new regulation. To the extent then that the federal legislative process al-
ready favors the well resourced and organized—as public choice theory 
 
289 The problem of the seen and unseen was famously outlined by the economist Frederic 
Bastiat. See Frederic Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in Selected Essays on Po-
litical Economy 1 (George B. de Huszar ed., Seymor Cain trans., Irvington-on-Hudson 1964) 
(1848) (“In the economic sphere an act, a habit, an institution, a law produces not only one 
effect, but a series of effects. Of these effects, the first alone is immediate; it appears simul-
taneously with its cause; it is seen. The other effects emerge only subsequently; they are not 
seen; we are fortunate if we foresee them.”). Bastiat suggests that seen/unseen effects are 
pervasive. That may be so, but when we notice them, there is no reason to leave them unre-
mediated. I am grateful to Professor Todd Henderson for this reference and relevant discus-
sion.  
290 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
291 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147. For an analysis of how Free Enterprise Fund 
may be generative of further jurisprudence, see Huq, supra note 161. 
292 In a challenge filed in the District of Columbia District Court, Article II has also been 
invoked to challenge new financial consumer protection laws. See Complaint at 3, 25–27, 
State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-CV-01032 (D.D.C. June 21, 2012). 
293 Public choice theory counsels for a skeptical view of legislative work product as more 
often than not an acquiescence to rent-seeking minorities. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promot-
ing Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mod-
el, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 243 (1986) (“In the legislative arena, interest group pressures are 
likely to prevail in a struggle to implement constraints on the efficacy of rent-seeking.”). 
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predicts—judicial review will “only exacerbate the influence of interest 
groups.”294 
It follows from the deregulatory slant to interest group litigation that 
the overall influence of individual standing doctrine is unlikely to align 
with the equilibrating goal of structural constitutionalism. If interest 
groups that litigate the structural constitution are motivated by a deregu-
latory agenda, there is no reason to expect that they will cease enforce-
ment of a structural constitutional value when it has reached its optimal 
level. To the contrary, they will keep pressing their claims until they can 
squeeze no more private value out of litigation.295 Further complicating 
matters, interest groups might use an incremental approach to policy 
change as a way to carve out potential opponents into manageable sub-
coalitions that can more easily be picked off, while also gradually as-
sembling a larger and larger coalition that is increasingly unstoppable.296 
This piecemeal approach not only enables a divide-and-conquer strategy 
by litigating interest groups, it also conforms to an observed judicial 
preference for minimalism on the Supreme Court.297 Due to these en-
twined dynamics, individual standing can induce larger shifts in struc-
tural constitutionalism than what may be compelled by the Constitution 
or socially desirable because “advocates can nudge the law to that end 
step-by-step.”298 In this fashion, the incentives of interest groups will 
lead to highly imperfect enforcement of structural constitutional values. 
It follows from this analysis—as well as from the more doctrinal ar-
guments developed in Part III—that allowing institutions to participate 
as amicus in individually initiated litigation is no answer to the concerns 
aired in this paper. Such participation may not cure flaws in causation or 
redressibility. It certainly will not redress asymmetrical case selection 
 
294 Elhauge, supra note 233, at 67–68 (noting that “the same interest groups that have an 
organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and agencies gener-
ally also have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence the courts”). 
295 It is no response to say that judges can simply cease enforcing structural constitutional 
rules when the optimum is reached. Judges have imperfect information and are prone to er-
rors. It is quite unclear how they know whether some optimal level of enforcement has been 
reached. They likely use the volume of litigation as a signal of how serious underlying con-
stitutional problems are, and will sometimes grant relief by mistake when it is unwarranted. 
296 The argument here is motivated by Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem 
with Incrementalism, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 815, 823–24 (2010) (describing a similar dynamic 
in interest group conflict over regulation). 
297 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2010). 
298 Levmore, supra note 296, at 822. 
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effects, which are perhaps even more important. In any event, empirical 
evidence of amicus briefs’ efficacy at the Supreme Court is mixed.299 
For the institutions concerned, moreover, amicus participation in the 
High Court may be cold comfort. By that time, they will have lost con-
trol over the choice of litigation vehicle to press a claim, the develop-
ment of a factual record upon which to render that claim, and the sifting 
of legal questions for appeal. Only inattention to the litigation process 
that precedes Supreme Court review, that is, can redeem the notion that 
amicus participation suffices to cure the Article III and political econo-
my concerns aired here. 
No invisible hand mechanism, in short, can be discerned in the incen-
tives of individual litigants lodging structural complaints. And nothing 
should come of nothing: Because the division of constitutional power 
between institutions at the beck and call of individual litigants risks 
large harm to the structural constitution, it should be eschewed. 
To summarize, conventional wisdom posits that opening the court-
house door wider necessarily conduces to more, and hence better, judi-
cial enforcement of the Constitution. This truism does not hold, howev-
er, in respect to structural constitutionalism. Instead, asymmetries and 
gaps in the distribution of individual plaintiffs with structural constitu-
tional pleas will generate patchwork distributions of judicial enforce-
ment. Analysis of the interest group determinants of structural constitu-
tional litigation compounds the case for skepticism by identifying a 
further cause of imbalance. Rather than promoting constitutional equi-
libriums, individual standing for the structural constitution therefore re-
poses the basic law in untrustworthy hands. 
B. The Political Economy of Institutional Standing for the Structural 
Constitution 
This Section deploys the “new separation-of-powers”300 approach to 
inquire whether institutions such as states and branches fare better than 
individuals as defenders of the structural constitution. A new separation 
of powers approach usefully draws attention to how courts are embed-
ded in a larger context of repeated interactions with other branches or 
 
299 See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 89 
Judicature 127, 129–32 (2005) (reporting evidence that is consistent with amicus briefs hav-
ing either considerable or no effect).  
300 See de Figueiredo et al., supra note 234, at 200. 
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the several states—all of whom anticipate and respond strategically to 
each other. Application of this strategic, dynamic lens to standing doc-
trine surfaces grounds for thinking that institutional litigants pressing 
structural constitutional claims will do a better job than their individual 
counterparts. That said, the claim developed here has but limited reach: 
It is not that institutions have perfect incentives, only that they might do 
sufficiently better than individuals such that the structural constitution is 
better left in their hands alone.301 
As a threshold matter, institutional incentives over structural litigation 
must be situated in the context of how structural values are maintained 
over time in the context of historical and institutional change. More spe-
cifically, the separation, checking, and equilibrating functions of struc-
tural constitutionalism must be realized through a fluid and evolving 
constellation of federal and state governmental instruments that are sep-
arated by two centuries from the Framers’ presumptions.302 Elected offi-
cials need to reach difficult, context-sensitive decisions about how best 
to create stable institutional arrangements and to honor structural consti-
tutional principles in novel and mutable conditions.303 Today’s safeguard 
of liberty can be tomorrow’s catalyst of catastrophe.304 In pursuing this 
complex task, elected actors must constantly account for nettlesome 
problems of translating the institutional aspirations of 1787 to the con-
siderably different economic, social, and geopolitical circumstances of 
 
301 Again, I should emphasize how I am bracketing here the question of whether the struc-
tural constitution should be completely taken out of judicial hands. 
302 On federalism, see Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 132 (describing the effect of “changed circumstances” on the federal 
balance). On the separation of powers, see Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Read-
ings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 453–72 (1995); see also Abner S. Greene, 
Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 129 
(1994) (contending that “although we must adhere to the framers’ basic principles, the prop-
er application of these principles sometimes looks quite different today than it would have 
looked two hundred years ago”). 
303 Even those who assert their adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning must at-
tend to this problem. For example, adjudication of the line-item veto in Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), entailed a determination as to how to understand the Pre-
sentment Clause in an age of omnibus legislation—a question to which there is no obvious 
originalist answer, and which divided the Court’s two originalists, Justice Thomas and Jus-
tice Scalia. 
304 Commandeering doctrine, for example, may have different valences pre- and post-
September 11. See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Feder-
alism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 1277, 1285–91 (2004). 
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today.305 Mere mechanical transposition of structural ideals will likely be 
a bootless exercise in vacuous formalism. The ensuing deals will reflect 
empirical and normative judgments about how best to update institution-
al facts to match contemporaneous environments in ways that honor best 
structural values. Such deals will also reflect the institutional interests of 
branches and subnational actors who play roles in the legislative and in-
stitutional design processes.306 To characterize the task as daunting is to 
shade on understatement. 
This account of structural constitutionalism’s vindication provides a 
reason for resisting an expansive standing regime: More generous stand-
ing rules open the door to a larger number of post hoc challenges to 
structural arrangement by losers in the design process.307 The shadow of 
such a challenge renders necessary institutional experimentation more 
vulnerable to ex post challenges, and hence less valuable in expectation. 
At a very minimum, therefore, adding individual to institutional standing 
creates a new source of friction on efforts to solve emergent policy puz-
zles through institutional innovation.308 All else being equal, more litiga-
tion will constrain the ability of political actors to adapt institutions to 
evolving circumstances in ways that vindicate underlying structural val-
ues—particularly where the litigants have no stake in the original deal. 
What, though, are the specific effects of institutional standing against 
this same institutional and doctrinal backdrop? The latter’s effect will 
likely diverge from the effect of individual standing because of the dis-
tinct litigation incentives of individuals and institutions. The incentives 
of institutional litigants furnish some comfort that granting standing to 
them alone will yield neither public choice pathologies nor needless fric-
tions on institutional evolution. 
To begin with, institutions such as states and branches already have 
some quantum of motivation to defend their own prerogatives, if only 
 
305 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) 
(presenting general theory of translation as a key term in constitutional interpretation). 
306 This is true for federalism as much as separation of powers issues. There is ample evi-
dence that states play a vigorous and meaningful role in the national political process. See 
John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National 
Policymaking 215 (2009) (concluding, on the basis of several case studies, that “state offi-
cials have numerous means at their disposal for resisting perceived federal encroachment on 
their interests”). 
307 Cf. de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo, supra note 278, at 168–69 (modeling legislation and 
litigation as a unified, two-stage sequence). 
308 Given the strong status quo bias of Article I, Section 7’s bicameralism and presentment 
process, it is hard to see why this friction is warranted.  
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sporadically.309 To be sure, it is surely the case that officeholders are not 
always motivated by the best interests of their institutions.310 But this 
concern is easy to overdo. There is ample evidence that participants in 
the American political system take seriously values of legality and con-
stitutionality, including conceptions of institutional fidelity.311 Govern-
ment litigators, in particular, may be especially attentive to structural 
constitutional values. If their careers can turn upon litigation success, 
moreover, they may have some incentive to rifle through their quiver of 
structural claims with particular care in ways that offset other shortfalls 
in institutional-minded incentives. 
More importantly, the new separation of powers theory teaches that 
states and branches are necessarily repeat players. They have many in-
teractions with each other dispersed over time. Even if influenced by in-
terest group dynamics, states and branches still have a powerful incen-
tive not shared by most individual litigants to maintain their reputation 
as reliable interlocutors and bargaining partners. This incentive arises 
because they wish to preserve the possibility of beneficial cooperation 
with other governmental entities in later periods.312 Institutional actors 
hence have some incentive to invoke the judicial process if and only if a 
given law violates some exogenously determined structural rule.313 This 
 
309 The claim that Congress and the courts in particular lack any incentive to resist execu-
tive initiatives is usefully complicated by William G. Howell, Thinking About the Presiden-
cy: The Primacy of Power 16–17 (2013) (“Congress and the courts have the wherewithal to 
stall, even halt, the president’s quest for power [but sometimes fail to do so].”). 
310 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. 
L. Rev. 915, 920 (2005) (arguing that officials often act based on personal and political in-
centives that do not entail defending institutional powers and prerogatives of the branch that 
employs them). For a skeptical view of Congress on this score, see Abner J. Mikva, How 
Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 597–606 
(1983). 
311 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 Va. 
L. Rev. 1001, 1031–34 (2012) (discussing various kinds of “administrative constitutional-
ism,” which evince an executive branch commitment to take seriously legal rules); Aziz Z. 
Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 777, 781–83 (2012) 
(reviewing Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madi-
sonian Republic (2010)) (arguing that elected federal officials are motivated by a preference 
for legality and constitutionality). 
312 On the evolution of cooperative strategy in situations of repeated play, see Robert Axel-
rod, The Evolution of Cooperation 54 (1984); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evo-
lution of Social Norms, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 137, 139–41 (2000). 
313 This is so even if officials’ actions partly reflect the play of interest group forces in 
Congress. It is reasonable to assume there is some dampening effect as a consequence of 
professional and bureaucratic norms.  
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is evidenced by the Solicitor General’s practice of “tak[ing] the position 
that reflects his best judgment of what the law is.”314 Something similar 
may also be true of states’ attorneys general, albeit to a lesser degree.315 
Institutional actors also have less incentive than their individual coun-
terparts to invoke judicial review if it means unraveling a deal in which 
they have participated. Even if institutions have standing to lodge struc-
tural constitutional challenges, in other words, they have some incentive 
to refrain from doing so and instead to accept the accommodations and 
innovations necessary for preserving basic aspects of the constitutional 
architecture against shifting political, social, and economic trends.316 Lit-
igation initiated by an institutional plaintiff is accordingly likely to be an 
infrequent occurrence, observed only when an arrangement strays far 
from the constitutionally plausible. 
The contrast here with individual standing is clear: Individual liti-
gants’ incentives are unconstrained by the allure of potential gains from 
repeated interactions and the compulsion to preserve reputation. Instead, 
they tend to be one-shot players, or at best representatives of interest 
groups pursing self-interested strategies orthogonal to the goals of pre-
serving structural constitutional principles or maximizing overall social 
welfare. Unlike institutional actors, they have an incentive to file suit 
whenever an institutional novation impedes their interests, whether or 
not that new law violates a structural constitutional principle. Provided 
that expected litigation costs are sufficiently low, interest groups have an 
incentive to challenge valid arrangements in the hope that a federal 
judge will err and invalidate the arrangement.317 Nor is it likely that in-
dividual litigants will make up for shortfalls in institutional incentives. 
To the contrary, it is odd to suppose that when officeholders are distract-
 
314 David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 165, 168, 172 (1998). To be clear, Professor Strauss is making a normative 
claim here, albeit one that he sees as having some resonance in practice.  
315 For accounts of the influence of states’ attorneys’ general, see Cornell W. Clayton, 
Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 
56 Rev. Pol. 525 (1994); Colin Provost, When to Befriend the Court? Examining State Ami-
ci Curiae Participation Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 4, 5–6 (2011). 
316 By no stretch of the imagination is this tendency universal. One might fairly criticize 
the state litigant in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), for being willing to re-
nege on a complex deal it had reached with other states to resolve an intractable interstate 
commerce problem. 
317 Would injury-in-fact doctrine as it currently exists prevent this kind of strategic litiga-
tion? I doubt it. Cf. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1281, 1305 (1976) (“[I]t is never hard to find [a] . . . plaintiff to raise the issues.”). 
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ed from the pursuit of structural constitutional values by parochial polit-
ical concerns, the very interest groups driving those narrow, political 
goals should be authorized to take up the baton of institutional interests 
in federal court. In comparison to individuals, therefore, institutions 
seem valuable defenders of the structural constitutional order. 
To be clear, institutional standing is not without its own concerns. 
The constraining effect of iterative interactions may be loosened under 
conditions of heightened partisan polarization, for example, if elected 
actors value short-term ideological goals more highly than long-term 
cooperation.318 Variances in collective action costs between Congress 
and the executive, or between the federal government and the several 
states, may also generate lopsided distributions of litigation.319 Or a mi-
nority of states might raise a federalism claim that a majority of states 
oppose.320 It may well be that these forces in combination sufficiently 
offset the beneficial effects of repeated institutional interaction, and so 
alter the valance of institutional standing. It suffices for my purposes to 
note that it has historically not been the case that institutions have re-
sorted to the federal courts often to vindicate structural constitutional en-
titlements, and that there is at least a plausible case for viewing a thin 
stream of such litigation as a safety valve in case of substantial deviation 
from the constitutional norm. Should institutions move away from an 
equilibrium in which litigation is infrequent as a result of increasing po-
litical polarization or deliquescence of their internal institutional norms, 
a reconsideration of institutional standing for the structural constitution 
may be warranted. For now at least, it seems to me that institutions are 
not implausible champions of the structural constitution. 
In short, whereas there are powerful arguments against individual 
standing for the structural constitution, there are at least colorable argu-
 
318 For an analysis of the causes of recent ideological polarization at a national level, see 
Nolan McCarty, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 666, 672–73 
(2009); cf. Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, 
and American Democracy 34–57 (2010) (arguing that party-level polarization does not re-
flect polarization within the population). 
319 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 53, at 441–44 (summarizing literature on Con-
gress-executive asymmetries). 
320 For example, the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2006)), 
had the support of thirty-eight states’ attorneys general, yet was opposed by other states, and 
was eventually invalidated on federalism grounds. Philip P. Frickey and Steven S. Smith, 
Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary 
Critique, 111 Yale L.J. 1707, 1729 (2002). 
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ments that institutional standing alone will do an adequate (but far from 
perfect) job. Individual standing in this context will tend to destabilize 
the federal-state and interbranch balances. By contrast once more, states 
and the political branches will often be motivated by more desirable in-
centives than individual litigants because they are more deeply embed-
ded in institutional cultures and iterative interactions. Comparative anal-
ysis in sum suggests that individual standing should be discarded in 
favor of institutional standing alone in structural constitutional cases. 
V. RECALIBRATING STANDING FOR THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION 
If the doctrinal and institutional consequences of allowing individuals 
access to the federal courts to pursue structural constitutional arguments 
are unwelcome, how should constitutional law change? This Part pro-
poses a new gloss on standing doctrine. Consistent with that proposed 
modification of standing doctrine, I then address a series of questions 
about the boundaries of its jurisdiction-displacing consequences. 
The aim of my proposed doctrinal reform is narrowly drawn. I do not 
propose to render structural constitutional litigation wholly nonjusticia-
ble. Perhaps that result is justified on other grounds. But I have not ar-
gued for that much larger shift in the judicial role here. Eschewing any 
such “bait and switch,” the proposal detailed here would mitigate the 
deleterious effects of individual standing for the structural constitution 
without wholly removing the courts from the business of structural con-
stitutional enforcement. 
The proposed new rule for standing in respect to the structural consti-
tution goes as follows: When an individual litigant seeks to enforce a 
structural constitutional principle redounding to the benefit of an offi-
cial institution, and there is no reason the latter could not enforce that 
interest itself, a federal court should not permit the individual litigant to 
allege and obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or fed-
eralism. In the mine run of cases, it is the case that the branch, the state, 
or an official of one of these governmental entities will have standing to 
raise a claim. Congress or the executive, that is, can and do sue to pro-
tect Article I or Article II prerogatives. States can challenge laws that 
exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority—as the recent 
healthcare litigation shows—or its authority under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In most cases, therefore, this categorical rule 
bars individual standing. Even when a litigant is hauled into court as a 
criminal or a civil defendant, so that a structural constitutional issue 
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seems available as a defensive shield, I would submit that no standing 
ought to be allowed—or, by way of alternative doctrinal formulation, 
that the individual has no entitlement to a cause of action for either in-
junctive relief or damages for violations of the structural constitution 
tout court.321 In a subset of cases, however, this rule would permit third-
party standing on behalf of the structural constitution when there is no 
institutional litigant available to defend a constitutional value in court. 
As a threshold matter, it is important to concede that this rule is at 
odds with Bond as well as with the recognition of individual standing in 
Commerce Clause cases such as Lopez and Morrison. I make no claim 
to find support in that line of precedent. Nevertheless, my proposed rule 
fits more comfortably with current standing doctrine than Bond. In par-
ticular, it conforms closely to the elements in standing doctrine that as-
sign judicial enforcement of an interest solely to the entity that formally 
holds and directly benefits from that interest. States and the federal 
branches already defend federalism and separation of powers interests 
respectively. Indeed, there is historical precedent for a state intervening 
in an individual’s prosecution by the federal government and taking an 
appeal precisely to press and secure vindication of federal values.322 Fur-
ther, future Courts should be generous in the construction of states’ ac-
cess to federal court if there is a move to limit individual standing.323 
The proposed rule also coheres well with the prudential resistance to 
granting third-party standing and the otherwise applicable rule against 
generalized grievances. In effect, the proposal would harmonize stand-
ing in respect to structural constitutional values so that it is no longer at 
war with the balance of justiciability doctrine. As an added benefit, the 
 
321 To my mind, nothing particularly significant seems to rest on the formulation of the 
issue as one of standing rather than a cause of action. I thus continue to speak of standing for 
the balance of this Part without constantly having resort to cause-of-action language.  
322 An early example is Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340–41 (1880), in which both the 
defendant in a federal criminal prosecution (who was a state court judge) and also the state 
of Virginia filed habeas petitions challenging the constitutionality of the underlying federal 
criminal statute.  
323 The precise delineation of state standing raises complex issues beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 387 (1995). It suffices here to say that there have long been many instances in which 
states clearly have standing to vindicate their sovereign interests. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 522–24 (1851) (granting standing 
to Pennsylvania to sue to prevent a violation of the dormant commerce clause); see also 13B 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.11.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“It is 
accepted that states . . . have standing to protect proprietary and sovereign interests . . . .”). 
HUQ_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013 6:23 PM 
1516 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:1435 
proposed rule abandons Bond’s reliance on the unsupportable assertion 
that there is a positive, monotonic relationship between structural consti-
tutional principles and individual liberty. In lieu of this implausible folk 
wisdom, courts would acknowledge the more complex relationship be-
tween rights and government structure. 
Enforcement of structural values would also no longer be in the hands 
of litigants motivated by exogenous policy goals untethered to the feder-
al or interbranch balances. Institutional litigants, as repeat players in the 
national political process that forges new arrangements to vindicate 
structural constitutional values, are more likely to file suit only when 
such an arrangement diverges from a desirable status quo. No doubt, in-
stitutional litigants’ interests are also impure. But so long as elected offi-
cials are somewhat animated by constitutional norms and institutional 
loyalties, there is little reason to think their aims will be as wholly de-
coupled from structural constitutional values, or that private individual 
litigants will do any better. 
Congruent with my rejection of the valid rule doctrine as a coherent 
principle, the proposed new rule would mean that criminal defendants 
such as Mr. Lopez or Ms. Bond would not be able to resist their prosecu-
tion on the ground that the criminal statute invoked exceeded Congress’s 
enumerated powers and thus trenched on states’ authorities. To many 
readers’ eyes, I suspect, this limitation upon criminal defendants’ ability 
to raise ultra vires challenges will seem undesirable. But they should re-
call that we already dramatically curtail criminal defendants’ ability to 
challenge their convictions. Defendants cannot challenge errors in bi-
cameralism and presentment.324 Their ability to challenge impermissible 
prosecutorial motives is also highly constrained, notwithstanding its 
immediate bearing on the fairness of a given conviction.325 And if de-
fendants cannot currently resist conviction on the ground that unconsti-
tutional motives have played a role in their own prosecution, how can it 
be odd to preclude them from raising the interests of third-party institu-
tions? In my view, the anomaly here is the current willingness to adjudi-
cate multidimensional questions of national policy at all in the narrow 
confines of criminal prosecutions. In any case, the infrequency of suc-
 
324 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
325 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“[A] presumption of regu-
larity supports their prosecutorial decisions and, in the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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cessful challenges to federal criminal statutes on federalism or separa-
tion of powers grounds suggests that elimination of this tool from the 
criminal defendant’s arsenal hardly achieves a meaningful change to the 
odds of conviction. 
The proposed new rule does not, however, eliminate any and all indi-
vidual reliance upon the structural constitution. Three exceptions, which 
follow in straightforward fashion from the rule’s verbal formulation, 
need to be identified and clarified. Each envisages some adjudication of 
structural questions at the behest of individual plaintiffs rather than insti-
tutional actors. 
First, I do not rule out the possibility that a defendant could challenge 
a coercive federal statute that plainly lacks any warrant in law under the 
Due Process Clause.326 The idea that coercive action based on assertions 
of legal authority that are manifestly unreasonable might compromise 
due process in ways that simply unconstitutional actions do not has a 
long pedigree. In early glosses on the Suspension Clause, the Court sug-
gested that the remedy of habeas corpus extended to postconviction only 
if the “judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court 
has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be errone-
ous.”327 The Court hence distinguished two species of constitutional er-
 
326 I should emphasize again that my argument does not reach arguments that an agency or 
government entity has erroneously construed a statute that allows government enforcement. 
See supra text accompanying note 43. In addition, habeas review of executive branch deten-
tion decisions operates like judicial review of an agency insofar as the claim that a coercive 
action is not authorized by statute plainly falls within the writ’s ambit. See, e.g., Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (invalidating, on habeas, the application of an executive 
order envisaging trial by military commission). A criminal defendant can clearly state that 
her conduct did not fall within the reach of a statute. 
 This sort of “ultra vires simplicter” objection to some sort of agency action, be it a quotid-
ian rule (in the case of APA review), an immigration or national security detention (in the 
case of habeas), or a criminal prosecution, ranks differently from the more free-ranging spe-
cies of structural constitutional challenge because it is not primarily concerned with constitu-
tional law, but rather with defining the metes and bounds of statutory authority. Hence, it 
does not raise all of the same problems of multipolarity as standing for the structural consti-
tution. Stated otherwise, my objections to constitutional review on behalf of individual liti-
gants is not intended to oust all statutory interpretation in the administrative agency context 
from federal court purview. 
327 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830); see also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) 163, 178 (1873) (invalidating sentence, where the sentencing court had already 
imposed the maximum available penalty). Over time, Watkins’s definition of jurisdictional 
errors expanded to include challenges to the constitutionality of an underlying statute. See 
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1879). The Watkins rule developed in complex, al-
HUQ_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013 6:23 PM 
1518 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:1435 
rors: particularly serious “jurisdictional” flaws and mere constitutional 
error.328 An echo of that distinction can be heard in the federal habeas 
statute today, which ties relief to “unreasonable application[s] of[] clear-
ly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”329 Similarly, constitutional tort damages are available to-
day when a coercive state action was not merely unconstitutional, but 
unreasonably so.330 
Building on these models, it might be argued that coercive action that 
no reasonable official could believe to be consistent with the Constitu-
tion should be a ground for judicial action under the Due Process 
Clause. In effect, this is to extend what Professor John Jeffries has re-
cently and cogently described in these pages as “a fault-based standard 
as the general liability rule for constitutional torts.”331 It vests individuals 
with a reasonable measure of protection from wholly arbitrary action, a 
promise that state action will fall within reliable and predictable bounds, 
and a commitment to some reasonable notice before penalties are im-
posed—but it does so without making individual litigation a license for 
adjudicating more generally the separation of powers. Such a defense 
could also be deployed in state criminal proceedings against statutes that 
allegedly violated some structural principle—a move that would bring 
the legal standard of review deployed in those proceedings in line with 
that used in postconviction and post hoc damages proceedings. Judicial 
experience with both qualified immunity and the habeas statute further 
suggests that this sort of fault-based trigger for judicial action is worka-
ble in practice. 
 
beit not wholly analytically satisfying ways. The best available reconstruction of the doctrine 
is Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 597–601 (1993). 
328 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992) (“Absent an alleged jurisdictional defect, 
‘habeas corpus would not lie for a [state] prisoner . . . if he had been given an adequate op-
portunity to obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the state courts.’” (quot-
ing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 459–60 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
329 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) 
(glossing § 2254(d)(1)). Note that this provision is only one ground of postconviction habeas 
relief, compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and does not always provide the relevant standard of 
judicial review. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007).  
330 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that executive officers are 
generally shielded from liability so long as their conduct does not violate “clearly estab-
lished . . . rights of which a reasonable person would have known”). 
331 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va. L. Rev. 207, 
209 (2013). 
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Second, neither the doctrinal nor the institutional arguments I have 
developed bear on individuals’ standing to raise arguments pursuant to 
Article III of the Constitution concerning the appropriate and necessary 
scope of judicial authority. Indeed, such claims differ from the other 
federalism and separation of powers values along two important mar-
gins.332 As an initial matter, litigants objecting to a proposed government 
action on Article III grounds often have a personal stake in the exercise 
in federal judicial power without analog in other structural constitutional 
litigation.333 There is no incongruence between their injury and the of-
fense to the structural constitution, as is the case in other litigation con-
cerning the separation of powers or federalism values. Consider, for ex-
ample, litigants who invoke Article III limitations on Congress’s power 
to overturn or otherwise modify final judgments.334 Once he or she has a 
judgment in hand, a litigant has a property interest that itself is protected 
by the Constitution.335 Vindicating that property interest can only be 
done by vindicating an Article III value. There is substantial overlap, 
therefore, between the litigant’s defense of the divisible individual inter-
est and the defense of Article III values. 
Consistent with this view, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael 
McConnell have recently offered an account of the Due Process Clause 
 
332 A potential objection is that states will lack standing to challenge federal statutes on 
Commerce Clause grounds. Many federal statutes, however, will have fiscal consequences 
for states, enabling a challenge. For those that do not, a federal court may wish to permit 
standing based on a sovereign interest in exclusive regulatory jurisdiction. 
333 This interest can be understood in due process terms. See Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article III, § 1, serves both to protect the role 
of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government, . . . 
and to safeguard litigants’ right to have claims decided before judges who are free from po-
tential domination by other branches of government.” (citation and quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
334 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225–27 (1995) (forbidding Congress 
from directing reopening of decided cases); Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Arti-
cle of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by 
another Department of Government.”); United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 
647–48 (1874) (“Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a cause, 
and . . . Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the re-examination 
and revision of any other tribunal . . . .”). 
335 See Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Causes 
of actions only become actionable property interests upon the entry of final judgment.” (cit-
ing Adams v. Hinchman, 154 F.3d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); accord Grimesy v. Huff, 876 
F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A] party’s property right in any cause of action does not 
vest until a final unreviewable judgment is obtained.” (citation and emphasis omitted)). 
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pursuant to which “government may not interfere with established rights 
without legal authorization and according to law, with ‘law’ meaning the 
common law as customarily applied by courts and retrospectively de-
clared by Parliament.”336 Like the Chapman-McConnell account, my ar-
gument here focuses on the entitlement to procedural protections in an 
Article III forum. Unlike them, however, I would resist a rule cabined to 
“established” or “vested” rights, which may have undesirably regressive 
distributive effects. Whether an interest is of common law pedigree or a 
product of regulatory action,337 it should in my view trigger due process 
protection. 
Similarly, litigants can vindicate Article III interests when they assert 
a right of access to that forum along with the procedural protections dis-
tinctively aligned with the federal courts. In the 2010 decision Stern v. 
Marshall, for example, the Court held that an Article I bankruptcy court 
lacked authority to adjudicate a state-law counterclaim lodged by an es-
tate.338 Citing Bond, Chief Justice Roberts linked the separation of pow-
ers to the promotion of “liberty.”339 Unlike Bond, however, the tendered 
structure-liberty question in Stern was neither ethereal nor abstract.340 
Litigants, explained Chief Justice Roberts, have a specific interest in 
“the defining characteristics of Article III judges,” such as tenure protec-
tion and salary insulation, which conduce to decisional independence.341 
The protections of Article III were part and parcel of the asserted indi-
vidual interest in fair adjudication. Unlike Bond, Stern thus adumbrated 
 
336 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 21, at 1679. 
337 Whatever force the distinction between vested private rights and public rights once had, 
I am skeptical that it has much normative weight in our more positivist era, when the distinc-
tion between ongoing regulatory action and the boundaries of private contract and property 
entitlements is far more uncertain. 
338 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–20 (2011). Stern was not the first time the Court has invalidated 
applications of bankruptcy court jurisdiction on the ground that it infringed Article III. See 
also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982).  
339 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609. 
340 I take no position on whether Stern was rightly decided. For a very helpful discussion 
placing both the decision in historical perspective and also exploring its consequences, see 
Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 3, 22 (2012) (“Stern 
has potentially far-reaching consequences that might unsettle the ability of the bankruptcy 
judge to control her docket.”). 
341 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609; accord Troy A. McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stern v. 
Marshall: History, Expertise, and the Separation of Powers, 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 23, 
34 (2012) (“More than a view of the platonic ideal of government form, the argument from 
separation of powers has been grounded by the Court in a concern about individual liber-
ty.”). 
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an alignment of specific individual interests (in neutral and fair adjudica-
tion) and constitutional structure. It is this convergence that distin-
guishes cases in which individuals seek to vindicate Article III claims 
from other structural constitutional litigation.342 
The other reason to distinguish Article III cases is this: Unlike presi-
dents, agency heads, federal legislators, or states’ elected officials, fed-
eral judges do not have access to litigation as a way of vindicating their 
constitutional prerogatives. Judges, simply stated, do not often sue. They 
depend instead on individual litigators’ filings for opportunities to create 
cases and controversies in which they are able to vindicate institutional 
interests pursuant to Article III.343 
Third, a final exception to the general rule articulated above concerns 
the now common practice of invoking structural constitutional principles 
as default canons of interpretation in the course of liquidating an ambig-
uous federal statute. The Court has invoked canons reflecting both fed-
eralism values344 and separation of powers ideals345 in the course of in-
terpreting federal statutes and regulations. Substantive canons of this 
sort have the effect of pushing the Court toward a view of an ambiguous 
statute or regulation that is more harmonious with the relevant constitu-
tional principle. For example, in the 2000 case of Jones v. United States, 
the Court read the federal arson statute narrowly not to reach arson of an 
owner-occupied private home so as to “avoid the constitutional ques-
tion” raised by the federal criminalization of such quintessentially local 
activity.346 Without application of any constitutional decision rule, the 
Jones Court vindicated a federalism value by shading the arson statute 
and thereby narrowing its reach. 
 
342 Other cases implicate substantially parallel claims. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 50 
(1989); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847–49 (1986); 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 576 (1985). 
343 Can judges use the fact that they adjudicate otherwise properly presented cases to vin-
dicate Article III? Judges surely do attend to Article III concerns—the rebarbative bramble 
bush of standing doctrine shows as much—but do not control the flow of litigants. It seems 
more straightforward to allow plaintiffs to raise Article III complaints plainly, rather than 
resorting to underhanded sub rosa protection of the relevant values. 
344 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467–70 (1991) (using a clear statement 
rule to shield states’ ability to determine the forms of their own government structures, a 
federalism value not directly enforced by the Court); cf. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). 
345 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443 (1989).  
346 529 U.S. 848, 858–59 (2000). 
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From one perspective, the defendant in Jones secured the benefit of a 
constitutional ruling (that is, acquittal) without the cost of full-court ar-
gument for that ruling. As such, the decision raises the same concerns as 
cases such as Lopez and Morrison. Such a perspective on the case would 
seem to suggest that constitutional avoidance canons tethered to struc-
tural constitutional principles should be abandoned. After all, it might 
seem to make little sense to allow via statutory interpretation what is 
forbidden as a matter of direct enforcement. That negative conclusion, 
however, is premature. The relevant avoidance canons can be justified 
on normative grounds independent of any Article III standing analysis, 
and therefore rest on quite separate foundations from direct enforcement 
of structural constitutional values. For example, federal courts’ employ-
ment of structural constitutional avoidance canons can be explained by 
positing that the Court is using the clarity of a statutory text as a proxy 
for the probability that Congress intended to “pres[s] the envelope of 
constitutional validity.”347 Only when Congress is especially textually 
clear should the Court be sufficiently confident that legislators truly in-
tended the Justices to face and resolve a constitutional question.348 In a 
similar vein, avoidance canons can also be understood as efficient 
mechanisms for enforcing norms that would otherwise go underenforced 
for justiciability reasons,349 that is, as “resistance norms” that raise the 
cost of enactment for constitutionally troubling statutes and thereby elic-
it legislative work product that is closer to constitutional ideals.350 Any 
one of these justifications provides an independent basis for continuing 
to use avoidance canons, whatever happens to individual standing for 
the structural constitution. 
Moreover, avoidance canons are relevant only when there is an ambi-
guity in federal statutes that needs to be resolved. Their use does not 
 
347 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); see 
also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon is thus a means of giving ef-
fect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”). For an effective and recent articulation in 
these pages of the countervailing view, see Jonathan D. Urick, Note, Chevron and Constitu-
tional Doubt, 99 Va. L. Rev. 375, 412 (2013). 
348 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 428 
(2012). 
349 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992). 
350 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1985–87 (2000). For a similar idea, see Matthew C. 
Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipula-
tion of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L.J. 2, 41–42 (2008). 
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necessarily increase the expected volume of private litigation to dis-
torting effect.351 Absent some inflationary effect on the pool of structural 
constitutional litigants, the reasons developed in this Article for resisting 
individual standing do not extend to undermine deployment of avoid-
ance canons. At the same time, this is not to suggest that the use of con-
stitutional avoidance is invulnerable to criticism. For instance, some 
commentators have condemned constitutional avoidance canons as im-
plicating the illicit extension of antidemocratic penumbras radiating be-
yond a constitutional rule’s limited orbit.352 I do not mean to take sides 
in that dispute. The relevant point here is that standard justifications for 
the avoidance canons stand or fall independently of one’s evaluation of 
individual standing for the structural constitution. Their continued usage, 
consequently, rests on a calculus that stands independent of the analysis 
presented in this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
Central among the concerns that animated the Framers’ conception of 
Article III was the proposition “that the control of public rights should 
remain in the hands of public officials.”353 Over time, the Court has 
slipped incrementally, incautiously, and perhaps by inattention into the 
practice of permitting private litigants to raise and obtain binding judg-
ments on the basis of structural constitutional principles. That practice is 
in tension with our Article III heritage and at war with many longstand-
ing practices from other domains of standing doctrine. At minimum, I 
have strived to show in this Article that the Bond Court gave too short 
shrift to concerns animating the bar on private vindication of public val-
ues. More ambitiously, I have argued the Court erred by affixing its 
stamp approvingly to the concededly longstanding practice of individual 
standing for the structural constitution. Both doctrine and political theo-
ry counsel strongly against that move. Little would be lost now, I have 
suggested, were the Court to reconsider now that undertheorized, weakly 
supported conclusion. Much would be gained by a pivot to a narrower 
Article III strait gate—a reconstruction of standing doctrine in which 
 
351 To be sure, they may have an indirect effect because they increase the probability of a 
victory for some plaintiffs, who are therefore more likely to bring suit ab initio. This infla-
tionary effect, however, is likely to be small. In my view, it is not sufficient to trigger the 
concerns aired in Parts II and III.  
352 See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 88. 
353 Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 106, at 712. 
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solely the institutions created by the Constitution could invoke federal 
court jurisdiction to vindicate their own institutional interests. 
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